NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION

Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Daniel S. Hamilton
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. UNDERSTANDING HOW TO BUILD A NATO STRATEGY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. NATO’S CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND CURRENT RESPONSES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report proposes that NATO adopt a new strategy called “stability generation,” built on the concept of ensuring stability in the NATO region and reducing the threat of significant conflicts in and around NATO’s adjacent areas in the East and South. To accomplish this, NATO must add resilience as a core task to its existing tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. NATO must also enhance capabilities in the East against conventional and hybrid conflicts, in the South against instability arising from conflicts and extremism in neighboring countries, and across the Alliance to decrease vulnerabilities and enhance resilience, particularly with respect to cybersecurity.

The strategy of stability generation crystallizes many of the efforts NATO is already undertaking, while also harmonizing and extending strategic ends, ways, and means. The strategy can be further broken down into three sub-objectives:

- first, to assure that the threat of significant conflicts that directly impact NATO nations can be deterred or responded to in a fashion that terminates the threat or ends the conflict advantageously to the Alliance and its members;
- second, that the Alliance will position itself to respond outside the NATO area when violent means impact significant interests of the Alliance; and
- third, to ensure that the Alliance and its nation states have sufficient resilient capacity to prevent and dissuade threats to the critical functions of allied societies; where practicable, assist in developing resilience for partners who seek support; and if conflict occurs, to prevail and to limit damage to the integrity of the Alliance’s nation states and their populations.

NATO MUST ADD RESILIENCE AS A CORE TASK TO ITS EXISTING TASKS OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY.

In sum, as part of an overall Western strategy, NATO’s objectives should be to deter, contain, respond, and remain resilient to the violent, disruptive, or military efforts of others.

The new strategy is built on four pillars: the traditional three pillars of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, all outlined in NATO’s Strategic Concept, and a new fourth pillar of resilience, which is crucial in today’s globally interconnected world. The requirement for resilience arises because hybrid war, including the capacity for cyberattacks, has changed the landscape of conflict. When war changes, so must defense. New efforts are urgently needed to extend the traditional activities directed at territorial protection and deterrence, to incorporate modern approaches to building a society’s capacity to anticipate and resolve disruptive challenges to its critical functions, and to prevail against direct attacks if necessary.

The strategy recognizes that, especially in a globalized world, NATO must 1) take into account the impact on stability of areas adjacent to NATO and 2) be a part of overall Western strategy by working with other institutions and corresponding national efforts of critical importance to facilitate a combined multifactor approach.

Accomplishing the new strategy will require sufficient military capabilities for both conventional collective defense and hybrid conflict; increased agility to enhance quicker and more effective responses; and structural changes encompassing cooperative actions and a strategy for resilience with civil government institutions and the private sector that tilt the security environment in NATO’s favor.

To build stability and resilience, NATO must undertake the following steps:

A. For Russia and the East

1. Develop a substantial collective defense by enhancing the current framework nation approach to focus on operational requirements, especially through prepositioning, developing reception and other logistics requirements, and establishing an additional maritime framework for the Baltic region;

2. Permanent or consistently persistent stationing of forces in NATO’s Eastern countries, including forces from multiple NATO nations (some of which could be deployed on a rotational basis);

3. Authorize the Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to move forces under designated circumstances where a NATO member is under significant threat and has requested such action without prior North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval; and

4. Encourage Sweden and Finland to join NATO, which would be a major geopolitical change, and until that occurs, enhance cooperation taking into account the overlaps among NATO’s Article 5, the European Union’s (EU) Mutual Defense and Solidarity Clauses, the Nordic declaration on solidarity, the recent agreements between Sweden and Finland, and the memoranda of understanding between each country and NATO.
B. For the South, including the Mediterranean and Sahel, and the Levant and Iraq

5. Substantially develop the framework nation approach, especially through developing stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian, and counter-insurgency capabilities, including the capacity to deal with migration;

6. Provide support to Turkey as appropriate under Article 4 and Article 5 of the NATO treaty;

7. Expand partnerships and partner capacity, especially with Jordan, the Gulf States, and Egypt; and

8. Offer NATO membership to Montenegro if it meets the required criteria, as part of a broader effort to use the open door policy to enhance stability in NATO’s Southeast.

C. As part of an effective resilience approach throughout the Alliance:

9. Create NATO civilian-military task forces—called “NATO Resilience Support Teams”—to cooperate with civil governmental and private institutions and entities on key security issues in order to establish the necessary degree of resilience;

10. Encourage relevant nations to establish working group-type secretariats to coordinate defense activities with overlapping civil authority and private sector key critical infrastructure functions, which could be called “National Resilience Working Groups,” and which could coordinate with the NATO Resilience Support Team

- in the East, which would be focused on the development of resilience and response to hybrid threats;
- in the South, which would be focused on resilience and humanitarian requirements; and
- throughout the Alliance, which would be focused on cyber and particularly its support to the electric grid and finance.

D. Meet key risks facing NATO in the information, burden sharing, technical and budgetary, and multifactor strategic arenas by

11. Creating a better understanding of critical new challenges by establishing an open source intelligence center with an initial focus on a) cyber threats and b) violent extremism;

12. Enhancing burden sharing by ensuring that Europeans provide sufficient framework capabilities, including forces for the East;

13. Meeting technological and budgetary risk by expanding Alliance technological investment budgets, including focusing on disruptive technologies; and

14. Ensuring an effective multifactor strategy by coordinating any NATO operational military efforts with an Alliance-wide working group focused on diplomatic, financial/economic, and informational requirements.
I. UNDERSTANDING HOW TO BUILD A NATO STRATEGY

Effective strategy requires an understanding of, and a balance among, ends, ways, and means, with an appropriate calculation of risk concerning each element and the overall result. Other words can and have been utilized in the definition of strategy: “ends” are objectives; “ways” are concepts or policies; and “means” are capabilities or resources. But no matter the terms used, an effective strategy requires the combination of all three elements: knowing where one is headed, how one plans to get there, what means are available and required, and an evaluation of the risks involved.

NATO historically has had two effective strategies. The first, of course, was “containment,” which over time morphed into a “containment plus” strategy as diplomatic efforts, such as the Helsinki Final Act and arms control, became important elements of the Western approach. NATO’s second strategy was "stability through enlargement." As NATO moved from a sixteen-member alliance to its current twenty-eight member states, Europe’s uncertainty in the early 1990s dissipated and in combination with European Union enlargement created an environment of unparalleled security for much of the continent.

The Alliance, given the new strategic landscape it currently finds itself in, requires a new strategy. NATO’s current three core tasks—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security—are "tasks" but not strategies—they do not identity the full spectrum of ends, ways, and means, and therefore do not tell the Alliance and its members either what to do or the risks involved. NATO has been working diligently but without great clarity or common agreement as to its end goals.

This is not to suggest that NATO has not accomplished important objectives. For example, the counter-piracy efforts (undertaken in cooperation with both national and EU forces) have been effective, as have various humanitarian efforts, such as, for example, after the Pakistan earthquake. But both Libya and Afghanistan exemplify the lack of strategic consensus in NATO. After an effective bombing campaign conducted by NATO, Libya remains a broken state. Afghanistan may be more hopeful, but NATO members often differed as to whether the key goals should be counter-terrorism, nation building, or humanitarian relief. Through excellent diplomatic efforts on all sides, a large, very expensive mission with at best limited strategic agreement has held together, but it offers no model for the problems facing the Alliance today.

Most importantly, NATO’s strategy should be but one piece of the West’s larger strategy that also includes the EU and the broader transatlantic community. Effective strategy is about more than military might, and NATO strategy needs to be a part of that broader strategy. Two examples clearly illustrate this point. While containment was the strategy animating NATO’s military efforts during the Cold War, in fact, containment as a concept predated NATO as an institution. Moreover, as noted, the Western strategy evolved over time into “containment-plus,” which encompassed key diplomatic elements such as the Helsinki Accords and various arms control agreements. Similarly, while stability through enlargement was NATO’s strategy, Europe is much more stable because of the combination of both NATO and EU enlargement. A comparison between, say, 1990 and 2000 and thereafter shows the benefits that the combined NATO and EU efforts generated.

NATO’s actions, while highly important, will be most effective when understood as nested within a larger Western strategy. This, of course, would be congruent with past approaches. As an important corollary, NATO is a voluntary organization that exists only at the behest of its member nations; accordingly, including the nations’ activities as part of the strategic approach is much more realistic—and will be much more effective. Finally, NATO should not always be in the lead; for certain issues, NATO will have a limited role while either member states, partner nations, or other institutions assume the leadership role.
II. NATO’S CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND CURRENT RESPONSES

A. Critical Challenges

Deciding on NATO’s strategic ends requires looking at the critical challenges facing NATO. The key current problems are substantial and well-known:

1) Russia in the East: Russia has become both a source of instability and a strategic adversary in the East. One can follow a series of Russian actions, foreshadowed as early as President Putin’s speech at the Munich conference in 2007, where he stated that NATO’s expansion was a “serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”¹ Russia has continued to view NATO through a hostile lens, placing NATO at the top of its asserted security concerns in its recent national military doctrine.² Much more important than rhetoric, however, have been Russian actions, which have included armed incursion into and occupation of areas of Georgia and the annexation of Crimea. More recently, Russia’s active support and involvement in the ongoing Ukraine conflict include arming insurgents while denying such support, employing inflammatory propaganda, and fostering civil unrest. But Russian actions extend beyond Ukraine. They also include provocative overflights and the harassment of air, land, and sea traffic of many neighboring countries, including NATO allies; intimidation and covert operations; financial manipulation; kidnapping and illegal border crossings; snap military exercises and deployments near borders; and casual threats of using nuclear weapons. Along with these external activities, the Russian government has extensively repressed domestic democratic entities.

2) Syria and Iraq: The NATO nation facing the most immediate threat from conflict on its borders is Turkey, with instability arising from both Syria and Iraq. The ongoing multi-directional civil war in Syria, including its humanitarian consequences with some ten million refugees and internally displaced persons, presents highly pressing concerns (including to its other neighbors Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon) as does the overlapping conflict in Iraq. The conflicts are a reflection of the increasingly severe Sunni-Shia split in the Muslim world. The conflicts not only have severe consequences for the region, but also for other NATO members because of the ideological and anti-Western aspects of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda affiliates and the number of foreign fighters, including those from NATO countries. As the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls has said, France “is at war with terrorism, jihadism and radical Islamism” (though, he made clear, not with ordinary Muslims and their religion).³

3) The Mediterranean and the South: While Libya and Mali present active conflicts, the entire Mediterranean is a source of instability, including the problem of violent Islamic extremism. This ideologically infused instability has generated ongoing terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, Tunisia, and elsewhere, which have fueled illegal immigration into Europe. Violent Islamic extremism requires significant analysis and the development of effective responses, including to the problem of home-grown terrorism. The issues surrounding illegal immigration have become increasingly severe, and the countries of the EU are internally engaged in generating effective responses.

4) The Resilience Challenge:⁴ The resilience challenge arises because of the multiple threats of hybrid warfare, which can take many forms. In cyber, the problem of vulnerabilities is very well-known. States and nonstate actors alike have established significant offensive cyber capabilities. The electric grids of NATO nations have been repeatedly infiltrated and are highly vulnerable, and intrusions have dramatically increased over the past decade. A recent report found a doubling of attacks against supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in 2014.⁵ As the Director of National Intelligence has stated, “Despite ever-improving network defenses, the diverse possibilities for remote hacking intrusions, supply chain operations to insert compromised hardware or software, and malevolent activities by human insiders will hold nearly all ICT (industrial control systems) at risk for years to come.”⁶ Moreover, as the recent US Department of Defense cyber strategy provides, “during a conflict . . . a potential adversary will seek to target US or allied critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic advantage.”⁷ But the requirements for resilience are not limited to cyber threats. Terrorists, state-run energy cartels, and “little

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green men” all practice hybrid warfare by using the processes and instruments of open societies to attack, disrupt, or weaken those societies.

Practitioners of hybrid warfare are often less intent on seizing and holding territory than destroying or disrupting the ability of societies to function. Antagonists wishing to inflict harm upon a society look to key nodes where critical infrastructures connect. When al-Qaeda destroyed the World Trade Center towers, it likely engaged simultaneously in attacks on the global securities markets through simultaneous market manipulation, demonstrating that terrorists understand how interconnected, and vulnerable, the world’s collective infrastructures are to attack.8

Defining a strategy for NATO must incorporate serious analysis of threats from the East from Russia; from the South, including Syria, Iraq, the Mediterranean, and adjacent countries, and the particular problems of Islamic extremism; and from the requirements of resilience as exemplified by both the challenges of hybrid warfare and of cyber.9

B. Current Responses:

NATO has a very substantial number of forces, but key issues relate to effective operational capacities. In the face of such challenges, NATO has taken important actions, particularly at the Wales summit in 2014 and at the NATO defense ministerial in June 2015. Broadly speaking, the most significant steps taken are improvements in readiness and the development of the framework nation approach.10

With respect to readiness, NATO has begun implementing multiple efforts,10 including:

-- Readiness Action Plan for “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the Eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis,”11

-- Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) (also called the “Spearhead Force”). The VJTF will be comprised of land, air, naval and special operations forces. The Force will be able to “deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory.”12

-- The Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters “readiness and capabilities” will be enhanced as will “its role as a hub for regional cooperation.”13


9 Other issues of relevance to NATO strategy are further afield though potentially very important. China, Iran, and Yemen are good examples. Each has other major actors other than NATO dealing with them—so the NATO institution does not have to be involved as a matter of immediacy.

10 The quotes in the following six subparagraphs come from the NATO Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, NATO, September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.
NATO’S NEW STRATEGY Stability Generation

-- NATO Force Integration Units and other force enablers will be placed in six Eastern NATO members. NATO will be ready to reinforce those Allies, including through “preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases,” with “adequate host nation support . . . critical in this respect.”

-- The Alliance will establish “an enhanced exercise program with an increased focus on exercising collective defense including practicing comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios.”

-- To counter the challenges that hybrid warfare poses, “where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design,” the Alliance will develop the “necessary tools and procedures,” including “enhancing strategic communications, developing exercise scenarios in light of hybrid threats, and strengthening coordination between NATO and other organizations.”

Additionally, at the June 2015 defense ministerial, NATO agreed to increase the size of the NATO Response Force to forty thousand.

The Alliance endorsed the flagship concept of “Framework Nations” at its Wales Summit in 2014. The concept facilitates cooperation among the allies to together develop forces and capabilities, with one designated “framework nation” in the lead for each functional capability. NATO designated the following Framework Nation initiatives:

-- Germany will serve as framework nation together with nine allies to focus on “capability development.” From the outset, the group will focus on building consistency in capabilities such as “logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection; delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable headquarters.”

-- the United Kingdom will serve as framework nation for a group of seven allies to “establish the joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).” The JEF will be a “rapidly deployable force” and be able to carry out the “full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations.”

-- Italy will serve as framework nation to lead a group of six allies, on a regional ties basis, to focus on “stabilization and reconstruction, provision of enablers, usability of land formations, and command and control,”

-- a group of allies to lead and man the Spearhead Force with Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway providing the current force, and the United States has pledged intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, special operations forces, logistics, transport aircraft, and other capabilities.

In addition, in the cyber arena, NATO has adopted a strategy that, while in its early days, provides that a cyberattack could trigger Article 5, the Alliance’s collective defense clause. While the current main requirement for defense of national networks rests on each member nation, NATO has also created a small cyber Rapid Reaction Team (RRT), which can work with nations in the face of a substantial attack. The RRT has already been engaged in various NATO exercises, though its full evolution is yet to be determined.

All of these are very sensible steps in the face of the challenges, discussed above, which threaten significant instability affecting the NATO countries. Each of these challenges has a military component, and each calls into play NATO’s core capability of military use as an element in overall strategy. But while current responses are sensible, they are only the first steps and in themselves are insufficient to adequately resolve current issues. The most fundamental issues relate to operational readiness, hybrid warfare, instability in neighboring countries, and resilience. The new proposed strategy is intended to ensure that NATO has the capabilities to meet these challenges.

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 The quotes in this paragraph and the indented sub paragraphs are taken from the NATO Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, NATO, September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, op. cit.
A NATO ISAF soldier speaks with local Afghans as part of a joint effort between British, French, Estonian, and Afghan forces to strengthen Afghan society against threats from insurgents. *Photo credit: ResoluteSupportMedia/Flickr.*

### III. NATO’S NEW STRATEGY: STABILITY GENERATION

#### A. Ends

The fundamental goals of NATO and its member nations are to assure the security, prosperity, and freedom of their populations. In a globalized world, however, with its multiple interdependencies, the international security requisite to achieving those goals is heavily dependent on the impact of and interaction with other nations. NATO’s key challenges come from regions adjacent to its borders, including cross-border challenges, and resilience vulnerabilities within the NATO nations themselves. While the critical adversarial actors are different—in the East, a nation-state organized along autocratic lines; in the South, multiple nonstate actors that purport to rely on theocratic justifications; and throughout the Alliance, a vulnerability of key critical infrastructures especially in connection with potential cyberattacks—the net result is similar in that NATO faces threats of substantial instability both on its borders and at home.

Under these circumstances, in order to achieve security and prosperity as well as maintain the freedom that NATO populations deserve, NATO needs to adopt a strategy of “stability generation.” The objectives of stability generation are to create stability in the NATO arena and its surrounding environs. The strategy of stability generation crystallizes many of the efforts that NATO is in the process of undertaking, but harmonizes and extends as necessary strategic ends, ways, and means to create an effective result. The concept can be further broken down into sub-objectives:

- first, to assure that the threat of significant conflicts that directly impact NATO nations can be deterred or responded to in a fashion that terminates the threat or ends the conflict advantageously to the Alliance and its members;
- second, that the Alliance will position itself to respond outside the NATO area when violent means impact significant interests of the Alliance; and
- third, to ensure that the Alliance and its nation states have sufficient resilient capacity to prevent and dissuade threats to the critical functions of allied societies; where practicable, assist in developing resilience for partners who seek support; and if conflict occurs, to prevail and to limit damage to the integrity of the Alliance’s nation states and their populations.

In sum, as part of an overall Western strategy, NATO’s objectives should be to deter, contain, respond, and remain...
resilient to the violent, disruptive, or military efforts of others.

As is apparent, the proposed strategy goes beyond just collective defense. Of course, NATO has long recognized the importance of a broader approach and acted upon it, for example, in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Collective defense is definitely necessary, but it will at times be insufficient strategically because of the impact of globalization.

The challenges outlined above underscore how important a strategic approach beyond collective defense remains for NATO. With respect to Russia and Ukraine, the Western response has been diplomatic and economic, including financial sanctions and the Minsk agreements. In the South, despite extensive military actions, none of the coalition activities against ISIS, or the actions in Libya, or the efforts in Mali could be described as collective defense. Likewise, in dealing with resilience, civil governmental functions and the private sector have been and are critical.

It should be recognized that the proposed strategy is significantly a strategy of preparation. In particular, when considering challenges in the areas outside NATO, NATO should prepare itself to have the capability to respond, but it need not automatically do so. The decision to take such actions will depend on multiple factors, including the nature of the threat, the role that nations and other institutions may be playing, the availability of partners, and the capabilities required and available, among many other considerations.

A strategy of preparation includes, quite importantly, a focus on and understanding of potential theaters of conflict will allow a much more thorough analysis of whether, when, and how such actions may be taken.

B. Ways

The proposed new strategy would be built on four pillars: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security—which are all included as part of NATO’s Strategic Concept—and the fourth new pillar of resilience, which is critically required in today’s globally interconnected world.

As outlined in the current Strategic Concept:

--“Collective defense. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”

--“Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises—before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.”

--“Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.”

The critical issues for each of these core tasks are not definitional but rather ensuring that NATO has the means to accomplish those requirements in the increasingly complex environment that NATO faces. This report proposes a number of recommendations set forth below in the section on means.

Resilience is a new but critical requirement for NATO. As discussed above, the requirement for resilience arises because hybrid war, including the capacity for cyberattack, has changed the landscape of conflict. When war changes, so must defense. New efforts are urgently needed that extend traditional activities directed at territorial protection and deterrence to encompass modern approaches to building a society’s capacity to anticipate and resolve disruptive challenges to its critical functions, and to prevail against direct attacks if necessary.

Resilience must be part of a new strategy that requires a broadened concept of the defense spectrum. Militaries are still highly relevant, but many critical requirements are civil. Resilience requires arrangements that encompass both civil government organizations as well as key private sector entities. Electronic financial networks, networked information systems, “just-in-time” food supply chains and business systems, air, sea, and land transportation, flows of fossil fuels and nuclear energy—are all both critically important to international security and also run by the private sector. Border control and response to covert action involve various agencies of law enforcement and intelligence. Dealing with propaganda requires independent media and governmental leadership from agencies other than the military. NATO’s defense must encompass societal and private sector resilience as well as military capacity while ensuring that free societies have the confidence to remain open societies.

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25 Except perhaps the recent Turkish military responses to ISIS attacks in Turkey, though in its formal discussion with NATO, Turkey invoked Article 4, not Article 5.


If NATO is visible in expeditionary missions but invisible when it comes to protecting the societies of its member states, support for the Alliance will wane. Its role will be marginalized and security diminished. NATO’s old mantra was “out of area or out of business.” Its new focus must include resilience as well as its established tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Moreover, particularly for key partners, NATO can assist in providing resilience when such support is requested.

But just as resilience is not a job for the military alone, it is also not just a job for NATO. Efforts to combat hybrid warfare and establish resilience must encompass new civil-military mechanisms and more effective cooperation with the private sector. The means to accomplish such requirements are discussed below.

C. Means

No matter how well developed the ends and ways of a strategy are, ultimate implementation requires that the necessary means be available and utilized. Means not only consist of capabilities and resources, but also of processes and structural arrangements. Generally, the means required by NATO to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century include sufficient conventional collective defense and hybrid conflict capabilities; increased agility to enhance quicker and more effective responses as and when required; and structural changes that cause the security environment to become more favorable to NATO and its nations. For exposition purposes, these requirements are separated below into focus areas for the East, South, and resilience. In reality, there is substantial overlap, particularly with respect to resilience and responding to hybrid threats.

1) East

a) Expand the framework nation approach in the East. NATO undertook key efforts at the Wales Summit to bolster its defense capabilities under the auspices of the Readiness Action Plan, the Framework Nation concept, and other initiatives aimed at countering threats from hybrid warfare.

These efforts need to be brought to actual culmination. Beyond NATO’s ongoing activities, however, there are several steps that will strengthen both collective defense and also NATO’s ability to respond to unconventional threats. The additional key requirements for the existing framework nation approach focus on operational requirements and are two-fold:

i) Forces will only be effective if they can promptly deploy. That requires prepositioning equipment; the development of expanded reception facilities, especially for aircraft and including helicopters; the review of logistics and sustainment requirements, including ammunition and fuel requirements; and the requisite infrastructure to move and sustain forces. NATO has taken sensible initial steps in these directions but significant further actions will be required. The United States has undertaken to pre-position equipment in six Eastern NATO nations and in Germany. Additional particulars, including efforts by other NATO members, should be developed as a result of the SACEUR prudent planning discussed below.

ii) Establishment of an additional maritime framework for the Baltic. The Baltic has become a much more contested arena as a result of Russia’s aggressive actions. A coordinated response is necessary and a maritime framework could help provide that within the context of NATO’s overall existing maritime strategy. The new framework should include NATO’s Baltic littoral states—Norway, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—and should seek to incorporate Finland and Sweden as part of their partnership efforts.

b) Permanent or continuously persistent stationing of forces in NATO's Eastern countries, including forces from multiple NATO nations (some of which could be done on a rotational basis). In the past several years, Russian forces have regularly undertaken large-scale spot exercises. The resulting problem of localized force ratios is one that NATO has recognized in the context of the Readiness Action Plan, the Spearhead Force, and the establishment of reception facilities in six Eastern countries. NATO should, however, take further steps to ensure that its generally dominant capabilities can effectively be mustered if and when the time calls for it. While NATO’s enhancing rapid response capabilities are highly valuable, permanently or continuously stationing forces in the Eastern countries of NATO will substantially bolster deterrence by improving force ratios, enhancing reception capabilities, and making clear that the Alliance is determined to protect its members. There is no need to regenerate a “Fulda-Gap” effort. But a multi-national set of forces continuously maintained (many likely on a rotational basis) will significantly change geopolitical calculations and enhance stability.

It is worth noting that the NATO-Russia Founding Act does not bar such actions. The Act provides that NATO had no intention in the "current and foreseeable security environ-

ment” of that time to permanently station “substantial” forces in its Eastern member territories. Russia’s actions with respect to Ukraine have completely changed the security environment that was current or foreseeable in 1997 when the Act was signed, and therefore, by its terms the Act is no bar to such actions as NATO may choose to undertake. Further, it is extremely unlikely that the amount of forces NATO would station could be deemed “substantial.”

c) Authorize the Secretary General and the SACEUR to move forces under designated circumstances. As the development of the Spearhead Force demonstrates, NATO has a significant need for the prompt movement of forces. Part of the requirement, however, is to ensure that the Alliance takes advantage of indications and warnings that the Alliance may receive. It may not always be timely to wait for full consultation by the NAC. In order to ensure that forces are

maximizing their deterrence factor, the Secretary General, in consultation with the SACEUR, should have the authority to move forces under designated circumstances. In particular, a major buildup on the border of a NATO nation could be a trigger authorizing such movements at the request of the affected nation. The NAC should consider and then create the particulars authorizing such movements.

d) Authorize extensive prudent scenario planning by SACEUR that will then drive NATO/nations’ military efforts and unclassified modeling to inform NATO publics. There are a great many possible scenarios NATO now faces that were unlikely even several years ago. Prudent planning by the SACEUR will illuminate the requirements for such potential circumstances. Such planning can drive NATO military requirements, thereby enhancing deterrence or, in the event of conflict, a successful resolution for NATO. Additionally, unclassified modeling would provide a basis to engage NATO populations, a key step for democracies, both regarding deficiencies and the need to remedy them, as well as to provide assurance. Classified modeling and prudent planning would provide the necessary critical military steps to ensure that NATO can provide the collective defense that it guarantees.

e) Enlarging NATO. Enlargement could have a significant benefit both to NATO countries and to potential new members. In the Nordic arena, Sweden and Finland both easily meet all the requirements for joining NATO and have worked closely with NATO and its members in operations and other aspects of security. It is, of course, a decision for each country to make as to whether or not it desires

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29 NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation May 27, 1997, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoqg/official_texts_25468.htm. The full relevant paragraph from the NATO-Russia Founding Act provides: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”
to seek membership in the Alliance. However, the ties are already very close. Both countries, for example, are engaged with the NATO Response Force, each has participated in Afghanistan, and Sweden flew in the Libya campaign. Further, each has responsibilities to twenty other NATO countries via the European Union Mutual Defense and Solidarity clauses, and to the Nordic NATO countries via the Nordic declaration on solidarity. Each regularly asserts that it wants to work more closely with NATO, and has signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO that authorizes NATO activities in each country, including in conflict scenarios. However, each country must make political decisions to actually pursue NATO membership, and their domestic public opinion is not substantially in favor of joining the Alliance. Yet, given the current changed context in which Russia has become much more aggressive, there is a strong argument for each country to join NATO both for its own defense and to make more effective its obligations under the EU treaty and the Nordic declaration.

2. South

a) Expand the framework nation approach in the South to focus on the enhanced development of stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and counter-insurgency capabilities. The areas to the South of NATO are highly unstable, creating challenges for NATO and its member states. A NATO response to such circumstances is necessary, including through humanitarian aid, stabilization and reconstruction, and sometimes counterinsurgency efforts. Recent efforts have, however, not been as desired in achieving intended outcomes. In developing an expansion of the framework nation approach to instability in the South, therefore, a good deal of analysis and planning will be critical. By way of an important example, in its most extensive operation, the Alliance has operated in Afghanistan for over a decade against a technologically inferior force yet has not been nearly as successful in creating a stable result as would be desirable.

NATO’s Afghanistan mission demonstrates that smart people acting in good faith are not enough to achieve satisfactory results. In Afghanistan, many different types of activities were undertaken, but there was no effective guidance and significant differences of approach. Even with respect to efforts with the same name, such as provincial reconstruction teams, there were very different ways of attempting to accomplish goals, and rather limited coordination. These issues, of course, relate not only to military but also to civil capacities, as well as to the local circumstances—but the plain fact is that, faced with future similar circumstances, there is little reason to believe that results would be any better.

In order to improve doctrine and training, a thorough review as to what has and has not worked in recent operations would be highly valuable. This review should fall under Supreme Allied Commander Transformation’s (SAC/T) auspices.

b) Provide support to Turkey as appropriate under Article 4 and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Turkey is, as noted, the NATO nation with the most immediate threat from conflict on its borders. Turkey has a highly effective military, but has still invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty on several occasions, and NATO nations have provided air defense support in Turkey. Moreover, the United States in conjunction with the anti-ISIS coalition is utilizing Turkish facilities for air operations. The Alliance should remain in close contact with Turkey with respect to the ISIS threat and provide appropriate assistance as and when requested.

c) Develop NATO’s capability to work with partners especially with Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states. In the South, regional states are heavily engaged in combating violent activities, and specific NATO nations including the United States and France, are likewise engaged. However, NATO as an institution can potentially play critical roles, especially in conjunction with pivotal states such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states, including substantial multi-national counter-terror training, development of doctrine, interoperable capabilities, and significant understanding of the countries of potential deployment. Partners will generally have a significant understanding of their own neighborhood and can thereby be quite useful in developing effective strategies. This can be particularly important in the design of the combined multifactor approach discussed below.

This will require NATO to recognize that, for many problems, its most effective efforts will be in support of others or as only one of many providing security. A good example of the “one of many” approach is the counter-piracy effort off the east coast of Africa, where the NATO task force is one of three such forces, in addition to individual country activities. Similarly, while the United States is already very active in the Gulf and the United Kingdom, France, and other NATO member countries are periodically engaged, NATO should consider working with regional partners in the Gulf to provide support to the free flow of commerce and also as a deterrent to Iranian activities.

d) Enlargement. Montenegro seeks to join NATO. Montenegro’s readiness is more open to question than that of either of the Nordics, but there is little doubt that it has made substantial progress. From a geostrategic perspective, the Alliance would gain significantly by having its southern boundary completed and by limiting opportunities for Russian expansion. Montenegro should be invited to join as and if it is determined that it meets NATO requirements. Further, the door to NATO enlargement should be kept open in part as an incentive to generating greater stability in NATO’s southeast.

3. Resilience

As discussed above, resilience is a new, yet critical, requirement for NATO. In the current circumstances, development of specific task forces focused on hybrid conflict and a broader Alliance wide approach to cyber are called for.

**NATO’S NEW STRATEGY Stability Generation**

*a) Create NATO civil-military resilience support teams.* NATO is taking steps after its 2014 Wales Summit to increase its ability to combat hybrid warfare. However, to employ such capabilities effectively, NATO will need an operational structure that can be deployed and which can interact with the requirements of the nation or nations at risk. Moreover, NATO needs to be able to combine its efforts with those of the civilian sector. Finally, NATO may need to act quite quickly in undertaking such a response.

A useful way to establish such an operational effort would be to create civil-military Resilience Support Teams. These teams would coordinate NATO capabilities and establish liaisons with relevant nations (particularly those in the Eastern part of NATO) who may be at the highest risk, and interact through the national team, discussed below, with civil sectors. All of this would allow for a multi-faceted response to a hybrid challenge.

In addition to or as part of the new teams, NATO will want to undertake substantial analysis on how to create the best operational approaches toward hybrid warfare. This might be accomplished by a combined effort between SACEUR and SAC/T.

*b) Encourage NATO nations to establish small working group-type secretariats both for the East and for the South to coordinate critical overlapping civil authority functions.* The initial focus should be (i) in the East, on the development of resilience and response to hybrid threats, and (ii) in the South, on the development of resilience and humanitarian responses, including to issues of migration.

As has been discussed above, in today’s environment, military means are most effective when used in conjunction with political and other civil efforts. To do so effectively, however, requires coordination among multiple institutions. It should not be surprising that a new institution such as a working group is necessary to ensure the most effective coordination. Indeed, it is highly improbable that the proposed NATO Resilience Support Teams could be effective unless there is a useful national organization available to support its efforts. Coordination, integration, and exercises at the national level will make outside support from NATO most useful.

**NATO AND OTHER SECURITY-ORIENTED INSTITUTIONS MUST CONSIDER HOW TO ENGAGE WITH NON-STATE ACTORS NOT ONLY FROM A CONFRONTATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT ALSO FROM A POSITIVE SECURITY-DEVELOPING POINT OF VIEW.**

In addition to or as part of the new teams, NATO will want to undertake substantial analysis on how to create the best operational approaches toward hybrid warfare. This might be accomplished by a combined effort between SACEUR and SAC/T.

*c) Encourage the establishment of regional working groups.* In addition to national working groups, concerned nations could establish working groups with overlapping issues—one approach would be to look to the nations in the framework arrangements for the East and for the South—with invitations later for others to join as they deem desirable. This would be somewhat similar to other institutions which have been created among nations such as the Nordic nations with Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and nations who are part of the Southeast European Defense Ministerial.

Such a regional approach would be designed to avoid the well-known political issues surrounding coordination between NATO and the EU. Moreover, it takes into account the important fact that there are different areas of emphasis for different parts of the Alliance, and that nations have great responsibilities in these areas, more than either the EU or NATO. A pragmatic effort along these lines will significantly enhance the security of both Alliance and relevant EU members.

**d) Bolster coordination with the private sector.** As the National Intelligence Council’s “Global Trends 2030” report discussed, and as many other analyses concur, there is broad agreement that power in today’s globalized world has diffused and that individuals and nonstate actors have increasing importance. NATO and other security-oriented institutions must consider how to engage with non-state actors not only from a confrontational point of view (as for example, violent Islamic extremism), but also from a positive security-developing point of view. This is crucial because resilience requires the private sector. A good first step would be to develop mechanisms to coordinate with private institutions and entities on key security issues focused on the development of resilience, with cyber as the initial arena. As noted above, NATO has taken some steps with the establishment of the cyber RRT, but its involvement with the private sector is limited.

The most important reason why private entities need to be incorporated is their operational capabilities. In the Cold War era, governments were the key actors and also the key targets. Now, governments are still key actors and targets, but so are private entities. Private entities operate key elements of the security structure. In cyber, the networks are operated by private entities, which have created key elements such as the underlying operating systems and maintain critical data. Accordingly, a mechanism is needed that joins the public, including the military, with the private. The key firms would likely include the telecommunications companies, other key structural firms, such as those providing operating systems and other critical capabilities, and the key data holding firms. Specific areas of focus might be the requirements to ensure that the electric grid would operate satisfactorily in the event of a conflict.

or that significant financial institutions would be able to withstand a determined attack. NATO should make sure that all can work together in an effective security posture.\textsuperscript{33}

There are numerous mechanisms to achieve effective public-private operational integration. But in keeping with the approaches discussed above, key countries with significant cyber capacities could form a working group to help devise approaches for national governments and key private entities in order to ensure coordinated operational efforts in the event of a major series of cyberattacks. Such an arrangement could coordinate with the NATO cyber RRTs. No such effort has yet been undertaken, but NORDEFCO established a Nordic Cyber Warfare Collaboration Project that NATO should emulate.\textsuperscript{34}

This now only includes government entities, but could easily be expanded to include private entities. Other relevant countries that can work with private entities might be the United States and Canada in North America, or in Europe nations already engaged together in framework efforts, although other groupings could be established—and operational techniques as well as information could be exchanged among the groups. Moreover, as indicated above, membership in such groups could subsequently be expanded as operational approaches were developed or, alternatively, other groups could be established.

D. Risk reduction

A key element of an effective strategy is understanding risks. Beyond the efforts described above, which are obviously intended to reduce risks faced by the Alliance, there are four additional risks that NATO needs to mitigate. These are: 1) greater understanding of new threats; 2) appropriate burden sharing between Europe and the United States; 3) technological risk and budgetary constraints; and 4) the difficulties of creating a multifactor approach. Each is critical to establishing an effective strategy of stability generation.

1) Build an open source intelligence center to help understand new challenges: A critical issue in all geopolitical conflicts is understanding the adversary. Open source intelligence is highly valuable in at least two arenas—i) understanding cybersecurity and ii) understanding geopolitical circumstances including, for example, Islamic extremism. In the past several years, private entities have carried out highly capable cyber attribution that provide outstanding publicly available reports. Similarly, the majority of information and often the best analysis available on violent Islamic extremism comes from open sources. Creating an open source intelligence center with an initial focus on a)
cybersecurity and b) violent extremism would significantly add to NATO’s capacity to evaluate critically important information. The benefit would be greatest if a small assessment team were available to supplement the information with useful evaluation.

2) Burden Sharing and the Division of Labor: Burden sharing has been at the forefront of the NATO conversation for a number of years, with a particular focus on budgets. However, in the East, the issue of localized force ratios also raises the important matter of the division of labor between the United States and Europe. The framework nation approach needs to be utilized not only to develop capabilities but also to ensure that European nations are substantially involved in the defense of the East. In the Cold War era, Europeans provided very significant forces, including forces along the front lines. While Cold War force arrangements do not provide any clear guidance for today’s problems, the concept of “significant effort” by the Europeans would, meaning that Europe should take substantial responsibility for its own defense. In that context, Europe should provide at least half, if not more, of the planned force. Absent such a commitment, the credibility of the Alliance would be seriously called into question. Europe has already taken significant steps to provide for the Spearhead Force, but it is quite a small force, and effective defense will require significantly greater capabilities. Defense is, however, a transatlantic matter. Concomitantly, therefore, the United States needs to maintain sufficient forces in Europe both to provide a credible deterrent and to maintain substantial capability. Reducing US force levels raises the risk of precipitous actions by Russia. It also enables a lack of action by those Europeans who do not want to undertake the necessary efforts to provide what is now a more difficult defense posture than was true in the past two decades.

3) Technological and Budgetary Risk: The third question that the Alliance must consider is technological risk and budgetary risk, which are inherently intertwined. The issue of budgetary risk has long been on the Alliance agenda, as most countries’ defense budgets have declined significantly. The Wales summit produced an Alliance-wide promise for increases, but there has been little noticeable action, and in fact some members’ defense budgets are still declining.

While the Alliance has long had important technical advantages, those cannot be taken for granted in the future. One of the most pressing concerns is the prospect of highly disruptive new technologies, including artificial intelligence and robotic systems, advanced manufacturing technologies, biotechnologies, quantum computing, and big data.

The United States is taking major measures to provide new technological capacities, because of a concern, as stated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, that the United States’ “technological superiority is slipping. . . So it’s all about innovation, it’s all about staying ahead of potential adversaries.”

Focusing on new, more capable technology requires recognition that investment is necessary, and the Alliance has a substantial set of issues concerning investment. The Wales Summit agreed that the Allies would increase investment, but the reality of doing so will be difficult. However, failure to do so will cause the Alliance to risk losing its technological edge with potentially catastrophic consequences.

4) The Combined Multifactor Approach: As the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 report stated, “Those countries with some of the strongest fundamentals—GDP (gross domestic product), population size, etc.—will not be able to punch their weight unless they also learn to operate in networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.” This is as true for NATO as it is for nations. NATO needs to learn how to effectively nest its strategy in an overall Western strategy—an approach even more important in today’s globalized world than it was during the Cold War or in the stability through engagement period.

One of the significant failings of recent NATO efforts is its inability to generate a unified, multifactor campaign strategy. Broadly speaking, there are three elements that regularly occur as civil sector requirements in circumstances where NATO is or may be engaged militarily. These are: diplomacy including the establishment of governance; finance and economics; and information. Of course, these requirements exist outside the ambit of military-related activities, but they are also crucially needed when the military is engaged, whether in a deterrent posture or in active operations.

In twenty-first century operations, NATO is unlikely to achieve effective results unless it utilizes a unified approach that provides for integrated military, diplomatic, financial/economic, and information activities. In NATO’s efforts over the past fifteen years, there have been some

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instances of reasonable common efforts and other examples of the absence of such an approach. The sanctions on Russia that followed its annexation of Crimea and incursions into Eastern Ukraine demonstrate a reasonably good common approach. To be sure, there have been and will continue to be differences of view as to the nature of the sanctions, but differences of view are to be expected in an Alliance of twenty-eight nations. On the other hand, given the current situation, NATO’s Libya intervention created a very significant set of follow-on problems, especially given the ramifications for the general population. While there can be no certainty that a unified approach of combining diplomacy, including governance, finance and economics, and information, would have worked well for Libya, there was not even an attempt to undertake this approach. While it is Libyans and outsiders who are causing the actual harm, when NATO acts with military force, it must think through the ramifications and intend to create stability, which the use of force generally undermines. If there is no intention to help establish such stability, then that provides an important factor counseling withholding force, although there can certainly be weights on the other side of the balance, such as a direct threat, that would still compel NATO to act. The overall point, however, is that in general a military effort needs to be nested within a unified multifactor strategy to accomplish its ends.

This last point becomes ever clearer when examining Russia in the East and violent extremism in the South. NATO could potentially have a significant role in the future. But if it does, it should come in the context of a strategic approach, also consisting of substantial diplomatic, financial/economic, and information efforts.

Each of the diplomatic, financial/economic, and information efforts that the West might undertake would benefit greatly from significant analysis and an assessment as to what has worked in the past and might be effective in the future. The Western nations have undertaken numerous major efforts, some including NATO, yet there is little consensus as to how to go about, for example, establishing governance or responding to a deceptive information campaign. NATO could help undertake such a review, but other institutions should be involved, especially civil governmental and private sector organizations.

Finally, transatlantic leaders must decide what forum should be used to generate a combined multifactor approach. The quick answer is to look to NATO-EU coordination, but this approach lacks merit for three important reasons. First, there are substantial political obstacles preventing full NATO-EU coordination. Second, NATO-EU leaves out the North American civil capabilities, particularly those of the United States. And third, Europe’s key capabilities are still under national auspices, not EU auspices. In short, a broader forum is necessary, although the EU could be involved as, for example, it has been involved in the Iran nuclear talks.

In the discussion above, the recommendation has been made to utilize working groups of various kinds. It would also make sense for NATO, before it launches an operation, to have created or be working in conjunction with a “civil working group” to help ensure that the necessary diplomatic, financial, and informational activities can be coordinated with the military. Such groups could be initially ad hoc—so-called “contact groups” may often offer a framework. The fundamental necessity is that there be advertent consideration of the civil-side requirements for effective security. Failure to undertake such efforts leads to the very real risk that the military will do its part in winning the battle, but the war is essentially lost by a failure to accomplish the diplomatic, financial/economic, and information requirements.
NATO has historically been an extremely effective alliance, in large part because its strategy met the requirements of the time. Today, NATO needs to adopt a new strategy of stability generation based on collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security with the additional task of resilience and the concomitant capabilities necessary to promote success in the twenty-first century.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

NATO has historically been an extremely effective alliance, in large part because its strategy met the requirements of the time. Today, NATO needs to adopt a new strategy of stability generation based on collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security with the additional task of resilience and the concomitant capabilities necessary to promote success in the twenty-first century.

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