STRATCON 2010: An Alliance for a Global Century

Strategic Advisors Group Co-Chairs: Senator Chuck Hagel and Tom Enders
Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board: General Brent Scowcroft

Co-Authored by Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer
The Atlantic Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century. The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international issues with a view to enriching public debate and promoting consensus on appropriate responses in the Administration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors, and the media in the United States and among leaders in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The Council is also among the few forums conducting educational and exchange programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders so that they will come to value U.S. international engagement and have the knowledge and understanding necessary to develop effective policies.

Through its diverse networks, the Council builds broad constituencies to support constructive U.S. leadership and policies. Its program offices publish informational analyses, convene conferences among current and/or future leaders, and contribute to the public debate in order to integrate the views of knowledgeable individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds, interests and experiences.

A rapidly evolving and uncertain world – in which new challenges and threats can develop either suddenly or over time – demands a reevaluation of traditional security relationships and strategies. The Council’s Program on International Security examines U.S. relationships with allies and adversaries in an effort to build consensus around policies that contribute to a more stable, secure and well-governed world.

The Strategic Advisors Group

To tackle the tough issues facing NATO and the transatlantic community, the Atlantic Council created the Strategic Advisors Group (SAG). Co-chaired by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Airbus CEO Tom Enders, the SAG is comprised of North American and European preeminent defense experts. Founded in 2007 by then-Atlantic Council Chairman General James L. Jones, General Brent Scowcroft and Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe, the SAG provides timely insights and analysis to policymakers and the public on strategic issues in the transatlantic security partnership through issuing policy briefs and reports, hosting strategy sessions for senior civilian and military officials and providing informal expert advice to decision-makers.

STRATCON 2010

The Strategic Advisors Group’s STRATCON 2010 project seeks to shape and inform the transatlantic debate over NATO’s new Strategic Concept. STRATCON 2010 issues publications to define the critical issues NATO must confront in drafting a new Strategic Concept. For more information about the SAG or STRATCON 2010, please contact Vice President and Director of the Program on International Security Damon Wilson at dwilson@acus.org or Program Associate Director Jeff Lightfoot at jlightfoot@acus.org.

The SAG and its activities are generously sponsored by the Scowcroft Group, EADS North America and Airbus.
STRATCON 2010:
An Alliance for a Global Century

A Report of the Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group (SAG)

SAG Co-Chairmen
Senator Chuck Hagel
and Tom Enders

Chairman, Atlantic Council
International Advisory Board
General Brent Scowcroft

Authors
Julian Lindley-French
and Yves Boyer

Julian Lindley-French is Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. Yves Boyer is Professor of Geopolitics at Ecole Polytechnique and Deputy Director of Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris. Both are members of the Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group.
# Table of Contents

Foreword ........................................................................................................... ii

Strategic Advisors Group Membership Roster .................................................. iv

Introduction from the STRATCON 2010 Project Co-Chairs .............................. v

STRATCON 2010: An Alliance for a Global Century ........................................ 1

  The Core Message .......................................................................................... 1

  Ten Principles for Strategic Concept 2010 .................................................... 2

  What is NATO for? ........................................................................................ 3

  NATO’s New Global Context ........................................................................ 5

  The Need for Greater Political Flexibility ..................................................... 8

  Strategic Concept 2010: The Agenda .......................................................... 9

  An Alliance for a New Century ...................................................................... 13

Appendix A: The North Atlantic Treaty ............................................................ 15
The Atlantic Council established the Strategic Advisors Group (SAG) to offer policy solutions to the NATO Alliance at a decisive moment in its history. Three years ago, the Council recognized that NATO had a window of opportunity to either fix itself or we would all suffer the consequences. Given the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, growing momentum for a new Strategic Concept for NATO and the arrival of new military and political leadership within the Alliance, we saw both an urgent need for new thinking and circumstances that might make courageous change more possible. These decisions would require political will, strategic thought and cutting-edge analysis.

To respond to these challenges, then-Atlantic Council Chairman General James L. Jones, General Brent Scowcroft, then-Atlantic Council Vice President Jim Townsend and I created the Strategic Advisors Group. When General Jones became President Obama’s National Security Adviser, our new Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel took over as SAG co-chair with Airbus CEO Thomas Enders. After Jim Townsend rejoined the Pentagon as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Damon Wilson took over his management of the SAG.

Consisting of roughly thirty-five leading North American and European practitioners and experts in transatlantic security, the SAG provides timely insights and analysis to policymakers and the public on strategic issues in Euro-Atlantic security. The SAG focused the bulk of its efforts and analysis on Afghanistan in 2007 and on NATO Reform in 2008.

Following NATO’s decision at the Strasbourg summit to draft a new Strategic Concept, the SAG created the STRATCON 2010 Project to raise the ambitions and influence the thinking of NATO and Allied capitals. At the first meeting of the STRATCON 2010 project, SAG co-founder Brent Scowcroft challenged the group to answer the seminal question of “What is NATO for?”

This concept paper responds to General Scowcroft’s challenge and offers a blueprint for a renovation of the Alliance to ensure that NATO remains the world’s most successful military alliance in an era of budgetary crisis and globalized security threats. Lead authors Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer argue convincingly that NATO must reestablish a contract among member states to ensure continued solidarity and that member states must commit to ensuring the proper level of effort for NATO to retain its military credibility and fighting power. This report outlines proposals to accomplish this.

I am grateful to Damon Wilson, who masterfully guides our important NATO work and the SAG. He and I are particularly indebted to Julian and Yves for their intellectual leadership in drafting this report. It reflects a collaborative effort benefiting from numerous SAG meetings and conferences. In addition to the report’s co-authors, the project has profited from the leadership and thoughtful insights of Robert Hunter, Franklin Kramer and Kurt Volker. Numerous members of the SAG have written impressive issue briefs on crucial policy issues for NATO that have already helped shape the transatlantic debate. They
can be found at http://www.acus.org/program/international-security or ordered in hard copy by emailing isp@acus.org.

Jeff Lightfoot has played a critical role throughout as SAG Secretariat, and Jonathan Ruemelin has helped usher this report through the editing and publication process. We are particularly indebted to General Scowcroft, Tom Enders, EADS North America and Airbus for supporting this important work.

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO
Strategic Advisors Group Membership Roster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senator Chuck Hagel –</td>
<td>U.S. SAG Co-Chairman Chairman, Atlantic Council Co-Chair, President’s Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Enders –</td>
<td>European SAG Co-Chairman President and CEO, Airbus S.A.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Kempe –</td>
<td>President and CEO Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Brent Scowcroft</td>
<td>– Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board President and Founder, The Scowcroft Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damon Wilson –</td>
<td>Vice President and Program Director Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neyla Arnas –</td>
<td>Rapporteur National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Brzezinski –</td>
<td>Rapporteur Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Durkee –</td>
<td>Rapporteur Former Special Advisor to SACEUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Gebhard –</td>
<td>Rapporteur The Cohen Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Lightfoot –</td>
<td>Secretariat Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael L. Bardaji –</td>
<td>Strategic Studies Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Billingslea –</td>
<td>Deloitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Binnendijk –</td>
<td>CTNSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sven Biscop –</td>
<td>The Royal Institute for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Boyd –</td>
<td>Former Deputy Commander USEUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Boyer –</td>
<td>Ecole Polytechnique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Buckley –</td>
<td>Thales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Burt –</td>
<td>McLarty Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Crosby –</td>
<td>EADS North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Dailey –</td>
<td>Atlantic Council Board Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Donnelly –</td>
<td>UK Defence Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrado Dornier –</td>
<td>Dornier Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Lindley-French –</td>
<td>Netherlands Defence Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashraf Ghani –</td>
<td>Institute for State Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Giambastiani –</td>
<td>Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebastian L. Gorka –</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Grossman –</td>
<td>The Cohen Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annette Heuser –</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Stiftung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hunter –</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hutchings –</td>
<td>University of Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Heinz Kamp –</td>
<td>NATO Defense College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin D. Kramer –</td>
<td>Atlantic Council Vice Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harald Kujat –</td>
<td>Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabrizio W. Lucioli –</td>
<td>Atlantic Council of Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Mirtchev –</td>
<td>Krull Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyko Noev –</td>
<td>Center for the Study of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioan Mircea Pascu –</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Paul Perruche –</td>
<td>Former Director-General, EU Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas R. Pickering –</td>
<td>Hills &amp; Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Ray –</td>
<td>The Spectrum Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomas Ries –</td>
<td>Swedish National Defense College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Slocombe –</td>
<td>Caplin &amp; Drysdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlan K. Ullman –</td>
<td>Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Volker –</td>
<td>Atlantic Council/Center for Transatlantic Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuck Wald –</td>
<td>Deloitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rob de Wijk –</td>
<td>Hague Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

In the late 1940s, a visionary generation of transatlantic leaders – shaped by the experience of the most devastating war in human history – decided to build a new world based on respect for universal human values and cooperation among nations. Thus was born the United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Court of Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the European Coal and Steel Community and, of course, NATO.

NATO was conceived as the security arm of a transatlantic community, anchored firmly in the context of this emerging international order. But as this new order took shape, the threat of Soviet communism grew larger, casting a long shadow over human aspirations for a better world. Throughout 40 years of Cold War, NATO protected a transatlantic space of free and increasingly prosperous societies.

With the end of the Cold War, the old security threats disappeared, and this allowed for renewed growth of democracy, market economy, stability and security within the Euro-Atlantic area. In successive rounds of NATO and European Union enlargement, over 100 million people, previously cut off by an iron curtain, rejoined a common European family. A renewed hope again took hold in Europe.

But as 1989 marked the end of an era, it also marked the beginning of a new one. New threats to the transatlantic community emerged – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises and the consequences of failed and failing states. NATO adapted swiftly to many of these challenges. But the pace of global change has outstripped the pace of adaptation within NATO, and this has left our societies increasingly vulnerable. NATO must now consider its role in an increasingly globalized security environment.

That is the background to NATO’s decision to produce a new Strategic Concept in 2010. We share the fundamental desire to ensure that the security arm of the transatlantic community has the vision, strategy and resources necessary to protect our societies in a complex and dangerous world, vastly changed from the one in which NATO was born over 60 years ago. NATO has enjoyed 60 years of success because Alliance leaders have historically demonstrated the vision, leadership and political commitment needed to overcome divisions and challenges. Today, we fear that NATO lacks the necessary political will to ensure that it is as effective this century as it was in the last.

As NATO drafts a new Strategic Concept to redefine the missions and tasks of the Alliance in an era of global threats and with France fully back in the NATO fold, the heads of state and government in allied capitals must find the same unity and political will that helped NATO overcome similar challenges in past decades. The Strategic Concept will fail if it does not represent a renewed sense of commitment and purpose among Alliance leaders.

We believe the Allies must end the post-Cold War strategic vacation of many of its members and recommit to a security agenda that strikes a balance between
defense of the Euro-Atlantic area and a commitment to tackling global security challenges, all backed by credible military capabilities and fighting power. NATO’s political leaders can draw inspiration from the courageous display of commitment, solidarity and dedication of the more than 100,000 NATO troops putting their lives on the line in Afghanistan.

Secretary Madeleine Albright, who has led a prominent group of experts at Secretary General Rasmussen’s request, is helping to generate the intellectual underpinnings for the next decade of the Alliance. NATO’s leaders must build on her work to put these ideas into action and to make the case to their publics for a strong and capable NATO.

To contribute to this effort, the Atlantic Council asked its distinguished group of Senior Advisors to offer their concerted best judgment on the challenges – and the solutions – standing before the transatlantic community today. This Concept Paper, and the associated “Issue Briefs,” are the fruit of that effort. We thank all those who have contributed to this extensive body of work, and commend their recommendations to the leaders of our transatlantic community, who now take on the task of writing the 2010 Strategic Concept, which will guide NATO for years to come.

Tom Enders  
Co-Chairman, Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group

Chuck Hagel  
Co-Chairman, Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group

Brent Scowcroft  
Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board
NATO’s purpose has three key elements: to embody the mutual commitment to the protection and defense of allies in the event of an attack; to help resolve international crises when invited; and to cooperate with others to resolve common security threats. The overriding goal of the Alliance is to make NATO citizens feel safe. NATO safeguards the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and promotes transatlantic security and well-being based on the preservation of peace and stability in areas vital to those ends. NATO is thus a twenty-first century security alliance and the transatlantic security forum combining political and military power.

The Core Message

The defining feature of the Strategic Concept to be agreed at this fall’s Lisbon Summit is that for the first time NATO’s purpose, principles and partnerships must necessarily be considered in a global context. Strategic Concept 2010 will be judged by the extent to which NATO adapts successfully to new circumstances and thus ensures the Atlantic Alliance remains a strategic cornerstone of international security.

What NATO is for is the question that Strategic Concept 2010 must answer. The Strategic Concept, and the process of creating it, must also communicate NATO’s purpose to allies, potential adversaries, partners and peoples at a time when the public finances of many members are poor. Today, NATO’s enduring mission remains to promote stability and security through effective political approaches to conflict prevention and resolution, built on credible military capabilities to support deterrence and provide strategic reassurance to all allies. This will require the Alliance to play its full role in the security and defense of the Euro-Atlantic community by striking a balance between active defense, credible deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, and ensuring that risks and threats are kept at strategic distance through modern and deployable armed forces. NATO must thus act as the natural forum for the discussion of defense and security issues by Europeans, Americans and Canadians who share the same democratic values and commitment to freedom and respect for human rights. To that end, NATO remains the central link uniting the twin North American and European security and defense pillars when vital interests are at risk.

Strategic Concept 2010 will be the first time that the Alliance properly considers its role well beyond the transatlantic area. This new reality must strengthen the determination of the allies to modernize NATO forces and structures given the many lessons from operations over the last decade. Such a goal will require the transformation of Alliance strategic and operational planning capabilities, reinforced by sufficient numbers of deployable armed forces. Given the downward pressure on allied defense budgets, enhanced effectiveness will only be achieved through much greater efficiency.

NATO’s original 1949 covenant is as relevant today as then: to guarantee the safety and security of all member state citizens by means of a potent military alliance built on credible armed forces and close political cooperation. Collective defense, as enunciated in Article 5 of the...
Treaty of Washington, must and will remain central to the Alliance. However, the Alliance must also re-energize both Articles 3 and 4\(^1\) and consider the future role and structure of the Alliance in that context. Article 3 emphasizes effective self-help and mutual aid as part of both an individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Article 4 emphasizes the need for consultation whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any member is threatened.

Strategic Concept 2010 must once and for all end the post-Cold War strategic vacation of many members and reestablish a clear contract among all members of the Euro-Atlantic Community, whereby all gain security in return for the equitable sharing of responsibilities.

2. **Balance Solidarity, Strategy and Flexibility.** In a fractured world, a complicated partnership is unlikely to generate unity of purpose and effort. Consensus, thus, will always be to an extent conditional with the need for flexibility paramount. To that end, a new contract is needed among and between all members of the Euro-Atlantic community that enshrines flexibility as the strategic method of the Alliance even as it spells out those core areas of defense where solidarity is both automatic and absolute. Only by balancing political and strategic realities will such a contract move NATO beyond a spurious rhetorical role to ensure each member gains security from all the rest in return for the equitable sharing of responsibilities. Such a goal will demand that NATO acts as the transatlantic security forum for political discussion given the challenges the allies face together.

3. **Promote Political Flexibility.** The world today is too complex for the Atlantic Alliance to manage critical security challenges alone. However, in such an environment, a strong Atlantic Alliance will be essential for the security and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Equally, there will be times when having a United Nations, European Union or OSCE flag on an operation, rather than a NATO flag, will afford a better chance of success. In such circumstances, NATO should be able and willing to play an enabling role.

4. **Reestablish the Link between Strategy and Fighting Power.** NATO is first and foremost a military security organization. Critical to both its purpose and role is the generation, organization and application of military effect. At the heart of Strategic Concept 2010 must be a commitment to enhance fighting power with capabilities and capacities designed to ensure the allies remain the world’s preeminent military group. Even the defense of members today requires advanced deployable armed forces with force modernization tailored to such an end.

5. **Strike a Better Balance between Protection and Projection.** For the Atlantic Alliance to play its wider military security role, the military stability and security of Europe (both members and partners)

---

1 Please find Articles 3 and 4, as well as the entire North Atlantic Treaty, in the Appendix located on page 15.
– and reassurance of all – remain central to NATO’s mission. Therefore, a **better balance is required**, based on assessed need, between protection of the home base against threats such as terrorism and the projection of stability.

6. **Recommit to Success in Afghanistan.** It is critical that NATO succeeds in the wars in which it engages. Therefore, the commitment to succeed in Afghanistan will need to be restated with conviction and demonstrated through action on the battlefield (in line with the Obama administration’s decision to push towards a stability breakthrough).

7. **Build Planning and Information Power.** Planning must incorporate at earlier stages new partners and a much broader range of sources of information. That will require far more effective sharing of intelligence, the better use of open sources and new knowledge partnership.

8. **Strengthen the Links among Command, Operations and Modernization.** Given the changing roles and missions of Alliance armed forces, radical modernization should become the key task for Allied Command Transformation (ACT), based on effective analysis, lessons learned, creative thinking and operational experimentation. To assure such a goal, a new relationship should be forged between Allied Command Operations (ACO) and ACT with a specific focus on reform of command structures. ACT should also link up with the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Strategic Concept 2010 will have to consider military perspectives and requirements after Afghanistan, in particular reform of the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the High-Readiness Forces (HRF). In particular, modernized decision-making and command structures which allow for effective and flexible command and control are needed at all levels, together with a thorough assessment of those non-military capabilities and partnerships central to NATO mission success.

9. **Modernize the Link between Minimum Deterrence and Arms Control.** The defense of the Euro-Atlantic community against any resurgent major threat should and must remain firmly based on credible deterrence, which must incorporate a credible minimum nuclear component, the role of which must be reaffirmed by Strategic Concept 2010. Equally, the Alliance must be in the lead to strengthen arms control regimes, both nuclear and conventional, as well as non-proliferation.

10. **Modernize Defense Education.** Effective defense education is a critical component to mission success at every level of command. Indeed, defense education is the great unmined treasure of the Alliance. However, education efforts across the Alliance are in urgent need of modernization to put the needs of the learner properly at the center of a technology-rich commitment to life-long learning. Such investment will strengthen the quality of individual members of Alliance forces, including the full range of skills needed for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and integrating military and non-military instruments of power and influence.

**What is NATO for?**

The Strategic Advisors Group. The Strategic Advisors Group (SAG) believes that a strong, positive and compelling message must be generated by Strategic Concept 2010. However, such a message will only be possible if the challenges, dilemmas and opportunities facing the Alliance are squarely confronted. The Alliance faces a question of common vision and political will as it questions its role in a globalized security environment and struggles with how to integrate Europe’s east, how to succeed in Afghanistan and how to develop the capabilities required to deter or win future conflicts. Strategic Concept 2010 will thus need to demonstrate the continued utility of the Alliance to leaders and publics, allies and partners and potential adversaries and enemies alike, even as the drafters seek brevity notably lacking in previous strategic concepts. This paper lays out both ideas and an agenda for Strategic Concept 2010.

**A Changing World.** The world is changing and NATO must adapt. Since NATO’s last Strategic Concept in 1999, Russia has reemerged, China and India have become major actors on the world stage, New York and Washington have been attacked with huge loss of life and Alliance forces have been deployed far beyond the North Atlantic region, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, new regional influence groupings have emerged, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African Union (AU). In this context, the Atlantic Alliance exists to organize large means in pursuit of large security ends in a complex and dangerous world. NATO’s purpose is to safeguard
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote transatlantic security and well-being based on the preservation of peace and stability in areas vital to those ends. To that end, the Atlantic Alliance unites Europeans and North Americans in dealing with threats. Today, the Alliance faces a range of challenges, risks and threats ranging from terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated missile systems, threats to energy security, cyber-attack and increasing challenges to sea and space lines of communication (the global commons).

A Balance between Efficiency and Effectiveness. STRATCON 2010 must strike a delicate balance. Greater political and operational flexibility will be central at a time when NATO forces and resources are strained. Strategic reassurance will be a central theme, but at the same time an assurance must be given to the Russians that cooperation with Russia is a high priority. The importance of consultation, partnership between institutions and future membership must be stressed even as the Alliance seeks to render the existing structure more agile and capable. NATO reform will be a central tenet of STRATCON 2010, but even as the Alliance seeks a major reduction in the number of staff and committees to reduce its $650 million budget deficit, it must not sacrifice effectiveness for efficiency.

NATO’s Uniqueness. NATO is unique in that it combines North American and European military power under the democratic civilian leadership of some 700 million people. When these nations choose to act, the force they bring to bear must be legitimate and successful. Strategic Concept 2010 must thus refocus the Alliance on its core purpose: the effective military security and defense of the Euro-Atlantic Community in the twenty-first century. To that end, Strategic Concept 2010 must demonstrate a clear understanding of current international trends. It must be firmly established on the need for intra-alliance political flexibility, and on the structures, capabilities and partnerships that will establish Alliance credibility in a global age. Above all, Strategic Concept 2010 must reestablish both the will and the capability of the Alliance to secure and defend its members in the face of emerging threats.

Comprehensive Political Guidance. The 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) laid out the challenge that Strategic Concept 2010 faces. “The challenge is to cope with an ever-increasing set of demands and with new types of operations. That is why allies are committed to pursuing the transformation of their forces: current and future operations will continue to require agile and interoperable, well-trained and well-led military forces – forces that are modern, deployable, sustainable and available to undertake demanding operations far from home bases. This also places a premium on close coordination and cooperation among international organizations and of particular importance to NATO is its relationship with the United Nations and the European Union.”

A Renewed Contract. The Strategic Concept’s negotiation will be the arena within which differing visions of the Alliance compete. For this document to have meaning, it must not reflect the victory of one vision over another. It must forge competing visions into a single compact in which North America remains committed to Europe’s security, and Europe recommits to being North America’s partner in supporting global security.

Strategic Concept 2010 must also seek to reestablish a contract between leaders, practitioners, publics and partners about the future place, purpose, roles and missions of NATO.
threats to the interests of allies and partners. Twice during the last century, Western democracies were forced into war at short notice. Consequently, planning, preparedness and performance are the essence of NATO.

_A Leadership Document._ While Strategic Concept 2010 will necessarily reflect consensus among the allies, it must also be a “leadership document,” eschewing lowest common denominator approaches. The disappearance of the existential threat for some NATO members (but by no means all) has changed threat perceptions within the Alliance. This trend towards strategic dissonance has been reinforced by globalization and the influence of Asia so strongly felt in the United States and Canada. Though shared values remain, there is not the same sense of a shared worldview that there was only a few years ago. It is in this new world reality that the shape of a new transatlantic compact will have to be forged and which must be reflected in Strategic Concept 2010. To that end, Strategic Concept 2010 must clearly enunciate the role of the transatlantic relationship in assuring strategic security and defense among 28 allies that are disparate geopolitically and no longer bound together by a single, common threat. Such political definition will not only establish NATO’s purpose, but critically its direction.

_The Treaty of Washington._ The 1949 Treaty of Washington remains the core political document of the Alliance underscoring the collective commitment to the security and defense of the Euro-Atlantic community. However, the shape and structure of that community has changed beyond recognition since 1949, as has the wider world in which it resides. The political challenge of Strategic Concept 2010 is to act as a determined statement of intent, based firmly on the provisions of the treaty, in particular Article 4 and Article 5, to reinforce stability and security in a world in which the unintended consequences of marked and rapid change will be the driving political reality of the age.

_A Decennial Reality Check._ Strategic concepts are in effect decennial reality checks recommitting the allies to core purposes and providing a roadmap for improving NATO’s efficiency as a generator and provider of military security and defense. Unity of purpose and effort are thus central, but in turn require agreement on level of ambition, structure, capabilities and, of course, cost. Thus, one of the basic challenges for Strategic Concept 2010 will be to state unequivocally what NATO must be critically good at by 2020. NATO cannot (and must not) seek to do everything. Specifically, Strategic Concept 2010 must consider the limits of Alliance action, in addition to considering the scope of Alliance action, what roles must be retained and where innovation must be generated to render NATO critically effective.

_Solidarity – The True Test._ The process of preparing a new Strategic Concept must restore a sense of trust and solidarity among allies. A true test of the Strategic Concept will be whether or not it offers a frank assessment of security, the place of the Alliance in it and makes a convincing case for the continued relevance of NATO. Alliances are built on solidarity and today NATO’s solidarity is under challenge, often more from rhetorical than actual challenges. Strategic credibility and strategic reassurance are the twin pillars of Strategic Concept 2010. However, these pillars must themselves be established on credible political will. Alliance solidarity must be strong enough to survive contact with danger. Today too many allies lack a shared conviction of the Alliance’s core commitments and their own responsibilities, and without it no alliance (nor indeed Union) can survive over time.

_NATO’s New Global Context._

NATO was designed as a defensive military alliance against a specific and well-understood military threat that vanished two decades ago. Since then, NATO has endeavored to migrate itself from a post-World War II necessity to an alliance that, in partnership with others, such as the European Union, considers security beyond
a purely military prism. Nonetheless, allies understand that military capabilities are fundamental to the role and purpose of the Alliance and differentiate NATO from partner institutions. Equally, today it is self-evident that with 28 members, differing views on risk, challenges, threats and opportunities are very real. The challenges posed by Afghanistan and the acute financial difficulties faced by most members further complicate the strategic dissonance that often marks the transatlantic strategic debate. This is reinforced by a strategic dilemma; today societies are still vulnerable to disruption, but although a whole host of risks and challenges abound, the existence or territory of no member is threatened. This makes defense planning, a core competence of NATO, very hard to quantify. Indeed, wrong choices now could well lead to an Alliance ill-prepared and unbalanced ten years hence. Strategic concepts are ultimately about choices.

Inclusiveness and Effectiveness. Given the pace and scope of change, the crafting of a Strategic Concept will be as much about process as product. The process will reveal whether allied leaders have adapted their mindsets to keep up with changes in the security environment and whether they can generate the political will necessary to deal with them. Strategic Concept 2010 will be judged by the balance it strikes between efficiency and effectiveness, but it will also have to consider inclusiveness. Indeed, Strategic Concept 2010 must mark the definitive end of the post-Cold War period and its relatively narrow focus on the shape and structure of Europe and the North Atlantic region even as it reinforces the commitment to both inclusiveness and effectiveness. The reforging of a collective Alliance identity will be central, given the complexity that abounds both inside and outside the Alliance.

Globalization and the Geopolitical Landscape. The West must be able to shape and influence the geopolitical landscape to prevail against what inevitably will be unforeseeable, as well as foreseeable challenges. The Alliance will be critical to that mission. A proper understanding of the implications of globalization will be vital. The new security agenda is expansive, featuring environmental issues, the long-term effects of biotechnologies, the changing nature of societies, terrorism, the potential “democratization” of mass destruction, organized crime with access to globalized networks of corruption and influence and, finally, the impact of globalization on democracy and the nation-state, not least through the growing role of transnational corporations. Consequently, new actors and new relationships will increasingly influence security agendas for good and ill. This will also lead to a new balance between states.

Function, Reach and Organizational Synergy. A fundamental question will be to what extent should and do European allies share America’s global mission and, accordingly, what role should NATO should play therein. Thus, Strategic Concept 2010 will need to reconsider both the geographical and functional reach of the Alliance. Indeed, the strategic context has changed to such an extent that NATO must become capable of greater reach than at present. At a time of financial constraint, closing the gap between tasks and limited resources will emphasize a level of organization and operational synergy both with the Alliance and between NATO and the EU that will ruthlessly expose lingering inconsistencies, redundancies and inefficiencies from which the Alliance suffers.

The Forging of New Partnerships. Strategic Concept 2010 will also need to consider the complex issue of who does what. This in turn will emphasize the need for new and strengthened partnerships. In the first decade of the twenty-first century a very different political dynamic has appeared on the world stage. The security concerns of many have now largely shifted from hard security issues toward more societal issues. The military balance no longer dominates power and equilibrium in the world to the extent it did in the past, although there is no guarantee that traditional challenges will not return. Herein lays the essential dilemma for Strategic Concept 2010.

Some challenges, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, require responses that are non-military as well as military. The very complexity that is the strategic environment appears to place a premium on increasing capacities for providing non-military security. The Alliance must embrace that reality, but in so doing affirm that credible and legitimate military power remains essential to achieving security effects.

Limits to Alliance Action. Strategic Concept 2010 must also establish limits to Alliance action. For example, NATO’s attempt to manage the consequences of mass
migration, protecting energy resources, fighting organized crime, combating terrorism or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could lead to a rapid dispersion of Alliance resources with a corresponding loss of credibility if not handled carefully. Equally, new NATO non-combatant tasks such as maritime security, anti-piracy operations and humanitarian crises, though important and relevant, should not lead to the loss of credible Alliance fighting power by spreading Alliance capacities even more thinly than they are today.

The Financial Context. Many allies are facing an acute financial crisis and, without a strong case for security and defense, the temptation to raid defense budgets will prove irresistible for many cash-strapped allies. Strategic Concept 2010 must thus make the case for military security, how best to organize it efficiently and how to afford armed forces. Specifically, **Strategic Concept 2010 must make the case for improved European and Canadian armed forces in the face of such strictures.** Even the forces of larger European allies can at best be characterized as a little bit of everything, but in too many cases, not much of anything.

Pooling, Specialization and Integration. More effective forces can only come through greater pooling, specialization and/or synergy. Strategic Concept 2010 must lead the way to a systematic analysis of alternative approaches and options, some of which could be led by the EU. Furthermore, a balanced transatlantic political relationship is being progressively weakened by an ever-widening gap in defense investment between the United States and its European allies. **Allies thus face a choice: let NATO progressively weaken to the point of strategic irrelevance; maintain what for many is increasingly pointless national sovereignty over armed forces; or seek closer synergies through both the Alliance and the European Union (and together) based on effective pooling of forces and resources.**

Current Operations. No Strategic Concept can credibly consider the future if it does not properly address the needs and implications of current operations. While NATO has a range of commitments, not least in Kosovo, NATO is today overwhelmingly focused on Afghanistan. Three things are clear. First, much of the future strategic credibility of the Alliance (and the utility of Americans, Canadians and Europeans to each other) will depend on what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the next five years. Second, sovereign Afghan civilian primacy will only be established if there is a partner government worthy of the name. Third, solutions have more to do with political and economic, rather than military-security, factors.

A Critical Period in Afghanistan. Strategic Concept 2010 will be drafted against the backdrop of a critical period in U.S. and NATO efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan, based on a series of new regional and functional partnerships to which NATO must be central. The success or otherwise of the McChrystal Plan and the implicit attempt to better harmonize American-led counter-terror operations and European approaches to counterinsurgency will influence the Alliance’s future modus operandi.

Russia. Russia is one of the Alliance’s great challenges. The strategic relationship between the Alliance and Russia is thus of utmost importance, with the aim of extending security and stability with Russia. **The Strategic Concept must restate the indivisibility of common security with Russia and promote constant dialogue given the many challenges and threats that Russia shares with its Alliance partners.** This is particularly important given the need to bring the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) up-to-date. To that end, an ongoing program of exchanges and discussions with Moscow over posture and doctrine will be vital. Consequently, **the NATO-Russia Council should be reinforced as an important forum for the discussion of mutual concerns and legitimate security interests and even common action.** Equally, though the
Alliance must be continually sensitive to Russian concerns, 
Moscow cannot constrain the sovereign choice of member states or those who seek NATO membership.

Strategic Reassurance. Strategic reassurance of Central European members of the Alliance will require their further integration into NATO’s future collective defense (including exercising and training on the territory of all NATO members), while seeking to avoid confrontation with Russia. Strategic Concept 2010 must reaffirm the fundamental principles of security embodied in the concept of a Europe “whole and free,” particularly regarding countries’ rights to choose their own alliances and, at the same time, offering partnership to Russia where possible. Missile defense will be central to the NATO-Russia relationship. Open to Russia, the new phased adaptive approach anticipates the future protection of all allies, partners and forces as part of a new spirit of collective defense in the face of threats emerging as a result of the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

The Western Balkans and Frozen Conflicts.
In the rush to consider the role of NATO in the global context, Strategic Concept 2010 must reassure those in the Western Balkans that the commitment to their stability and security remains unquestioned. Significant NATO forces remain in Kosovo and the Alliance is supporting an EU-led force (EUFOR) in Bosnia. With the accession of Albania and Croatia to the Alliance, and the decision to accept Macedonia upon resolution of the name issue, Strategic Concept 2010 must consider NATO’s political path in the Western Balkans, including the question of possible future membership for Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia. There are also several “frozen conflicts” on NATO’s periphery which could at any time lead to open conflict and which cannot and must not be ignored. The capacity to bring sizable and effective military assets to bear (in stabilizing or rescue/humanitarian roles) will remain essential to the stability of Europe and beyond and thus an integral part of NATO’s mission.

The Need for Greater Political Flexibility

The political identity of engagement will be pivotal to mission success. There will be times when having a UN, EU or OSCE flag on an operation will afford a better chance of success than a NATO flag. Subsidiarity – leadership by the institution or nation best placed to succeed at the lowest level of command necessary for effectiveness – will be an important element for dealing with complex and sustained crises. Indeed, in such circumstances, NATO should be able and willing to play an enabling role. One issue germane to Strategic Concept 2010 will be how best to strengthen contacts between NATO and all international actors engaged in crisis management. Moreover, NATO structures should become more flexible by reaching out to partner institutions and including them in the planning process, given that different institutions and actors are able to decide and act at varying speeds.

The Future NATO-EU Relationship.
Now that the Lisbon Treaty has been signed, the EU’s CSDP should be formally recognized in Strategic Concept 2010 as bringing a new dimension to the Alliance through the respective and concomitant development of European military capabilities and command structures. It is time to move beyond “Berlin-plus” and put in place a new structure that affords Europeans opportunities to generate and lead coalitions. Such a structure should also consider the possibility of a new EU treaty-based defense initiative, allied to appropriate non-military EU operations. Strategic Concept 2010 should reflect the Atlantic Alliance’s full commitment to strengthening the EU’s role. Such a step will be important for creating a new narrative for enhanced capabilities.

The NATO-CSDP Interface. An effective interface between CSDP and NATO should add impetus to the reform of SHAPE, NATO’s military headquarters, and promote synergy between the International Military Staff, the
International Staff and the EU Military Staff given that any Strategic Headquarters must now reach out to a range of actors critical to mission success. Strategic Concept 2010 should thus support CSDP as a means to afford the Western democracies a complementary framework for action. Plurality in the functioning of the Alliance is a reality and Strategic Concept 2010 must reflect that. Equally, complementarity and institutional specialization between NATO and the EU must be more clearly and formally established reinforcing NATO’s role in its core competences.

**Power Partnerships.** Externally, there is a plethora of potential new partners and groupings, some likely to be supportive of allied goals and some adversarial. Organizations with which NATO might work may possess greater regional or functional expertise than the Alliance. Certainly the Alliance will need new power partners, such as Australia, India, Brazil and Japan and even China and Russia, in particular circumstances. **Strategic Concept 2010 will need to open further the political door to such partnerships,** particularly at the military-to-military level.

**Operational Partnerships.** NATO militaries will also benefit from partnering to enhance mission success. It is evident from operations in Afghanistan that relations with host and regional governments, as well as with civilians in international and non-governmental organizations, are important factors in success. Strategic Concept 2010 must pave the way for a new set of relationships with such groups, beginning in the early phases of campaign planning. For example, NATO Standards ("STANAGS") should be used to establish a standard command and control format for coalitions.

**Strategic Concept 2010: The Agenda**

Strategic Concept 2010 must establish new standards for best practice and enhanced cooperation if it is to push the Alliance to overcome the many constraints it now faces. In the current climate, a new concept of transformation will be needed based on a simple credo – greater effectiveness through greater efficiencies. It should proceed with a clear mission to rebuild a collective Alliance identity and gain support for it within allied countries based on four high-level steps: enhanced conduct of operations; unity of effort and purpose at all levels; extended use of common funding; and expanded cooperation with partner institutions, most notably the EU. Equally, it should remain sober in its wording and short in expression, with the specific objective of convincing leader and citizen alike of the continued vital role of the Alliance as a strategic cornerstone – indeed, for the West, the strategic cornerstone.

**An Important Moment.** Strategic Concept 2010 must also emphasize the importance of this moment globally. All strategic concepts prior to 1989 focused squarely on the defense of Europe. Meanwhile, the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts were concerned primarily with the security of Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. **Strategic Concept 2010 is the first time that the role of the Atlantic Alliance in a global context will and must be properly considered:** not because NATO could potentially be involved everywhere, but because much that is happening in distant parts of the global impact on the security and other interests of allies and thus are relevant to NATO’s future.

**A Shared Level of Ambition.** Because Strategic Concept 2010 will necessarily consider NATO’s role in that context, a shared level of ambition and concomitant unity of purpose is critically important. The Concept must clearly enunciate such ambition. The ambition is not a global NATO – far from it. However, the future missions, structure and capabilities of the Alliance must be considered in the global context if the Atlantic Alliance is to restore its credibility as an anchor of stability through effective military power. Therefore, the Strategic Concept 2010 agenda must:

1. **Re-examine Alliance Purpose.** A reconsideration of where NATO can be most effective, given the strategic environment, the policies and roles of partners and, most importantly from NATO’s perspective, the role of armed forces in a complex security environment will be central to agreement on the Alliance’s purpose. Indeed, only then can
strategic judgments and defense planning dilemmas be resolved. This in turn requires reconsidering where NATO should focus its future efforts and the optimal organization needed for the Alliance to be effective based on a commonly agreed understanding of minimum levels of military capability.

2. **Scope of NATO's Future Missions.** The credibility of NATO action depends on the cohesion and the resolve of members. NATO's core tasks are challenging enough given the complexity of the contemporary strategic environment. Hard defense and security will therefore remain the primary task of the Alliance, whereas challenges not requiring a military component are likely to remain outside the purview of the Alliance. NATO as a whole is unlikely to reach consensus on either such challenges or the resources to cope with challenges that do not directly threaten the strategic interests of Alliance members. However, preparedness is key to effective defense planning and that can only be built on a thorough understanding of medium- to long-term trends to establish the case for further structural and capability reform.

3. **Balance Partnership and Membership.** Strategic Concept 2010 will also need to address the issue of partnership and membership. There are always going to be states that seek either formal membership or close partnership who remain outside Article 5 obligations. The Alliance has developed mechanisms to incorporate partners into Alliance activities and operations, often blurring the distinction between member and partner. Nonetheless, the Article 5 commitment is not ambiguous; it represents a commitment among treaty allies only. The 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia in effect demonstrated the limits of Article 5 – despite the commitment made at the Bucharest NATO summit to Georgia’s eventual membership, no ally was prepared to send military forces to Georgia’s defense. It is also not at all clear whether Ukraine will one day seek membership, and if so, whether allies will judge it is ready and be willing to offer membership. While the Open Door policy will be maintained, “partner” status will be critical for states that are important, but unlikely to be offered membership in the near-term, either on grounds of their own unsuitability or because the Alliance has put a higher priority on restoring its military effectiveness.

4. **Modernize Article 5 and the Defense Architecture.** Strategic Concept 2010 must launch the modernization of NATO’s future defense architecture. Specifically, if Article 5 is to remain politically credible, a vision is needed of strategic reassurance and main defense, the system of defense needed and the armed forces required to implement them. Such a vision would properly consider the utility of missile defense, cyber-defense, critical infrastructure protection and consequence management.

5. **Modernize the Defense Planning Approach.** If Alliance priorities are to be firmly established, effective defense planning must be central to Alliance business, along with the better use of and compliance with the integrated defense planning process (IDPP). NATO defense planning must emphasize endurance, flexibility and mentoring at all levels. In turn, that will require a firm grip of the force and resource implications of the various stabilizing and security roles NATO will be called upon to play, with a firm understanding that NATO will not always need to establish a large operational footprint. This can hold true whether NATO serves as an offshore power-balancer, an enhancer of the military effectiveness of allies and partners or as an agent for strengthening the forces and security structures of host nations for example through Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs).

6. **Create a New Flexible Response Doctrine.** The balance between defense, pre-emption, force modernization and the military capacity of partners will take on increased importance, and Strategic Concept 2010 must reflect that. This will require a new form of flexible response in which enhanced fighting power is seen in a broad security context. To that end, mentoring allies and partners will be critical not only if the forces of allies and partners are to be effective across a range of missions,
but also to reinforce the case for armed forces in some smaller NATO members at a time of acute financial stress.

7. **Streamline NATO.** The Secretary General needs new authorities and structures to better manage NATO and to curb the budget deficit. While political will is the most important ingredient for efficient decision-making, Strategic Concept 2010 must lead to the streamlining of the NATO bureaucracy, driven by the dictates of NATO’s strategic mission. Indeed, now that the Alliance has completed three rounds of post-Cold War enlargement, the policy of emphasizing representation and inclusion above effectiveness and efficiency should be brought swiftly to an end. Streamlining will require a fundamental change in the concept of effectiveness and further reform of Alliance institutions. NATO today has over three hundred committees. The merging of the International Staff and International Military Staff into a single institutional framework and the reduction in the number of military headquarters are necessary first steps. The reform of SHAPE, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum and AFSOUTH Naples, along with their relationship to EUCOM and CENTCOM, also need to be considered. A better balance will also need to be struck between the number of officers at HQ levels and operational commands. NATO bureaucracy should engage the minimum number of officers and officials to ensure talent remains at the cutting edge of Alliance armed forces.

8. **Enhance Multinational Military Formations.** NATO is and must remain the organizing nexus of effective military power *par excellence*. However, to sustain such a critical role as its mission in Afghanistan diminishes, major elements of NATO’s military power will need to be reconfigured. Part of this reconstitution will be to reestablish effective command and control and interoperability to restore multinational formations to health. Too often in Afghanistan, the instinctive retreat into national command stovepipes undercuts multinational formations, which has undermined solidarity. Such a retreat has been accelerated by major shortfalls in the development and implementation of the Comprehensive Approach and the sheer complexity of getting civilians and military to work together even at the national level. The effective organization and role of multinational formations are the necessary way forward even at the national level. NATO forces and commands such as the NATO Response Force and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) must be re-energized as vehicles for command and operational modernization, particularly command and control. Central to Strategic Concept 2010 will be a vision of future military roles: the shape of main defense in 2020, the balance to be struck between High Readiness Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces and how best further to develop the Comprehensive Approach.

9. **Embed the Lessons of Hybrid Conflict.** A greater and more systematic effort is needed to embed lessons and practices from current operations and analysis to ensure that civil-military cooperation exists at all levels of the command chain. To that end, NATO should adopt a series of civilian-led exercises both to expand the pool of qualified civilians and to enhance their competence – but firmly established within the NATO structure.

10. **Operationalize the Comprehensive Approach.** Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach will require NATO to act as a nexus for complex campaign planning based on effective command and control involving and incorporating a broad set of partners, both civil and military. Drawing on the best practices and lessons learned from Afghanistan, the Alliance needs to systematically develop a meaningful set of organization and interoperability standards relevant to members and partners alike. The organization of whole-of-government efforts will remain critical to mission success in complex environments over the next decade. Indeed, harmonizing defense, diplomacy and development will be a central tenet of Alliance planning functions. **Strategic Concept 2010 must thus consider how best to internationalize the Comprehensive Approach to make NATO (rather than individual allies) the organizing nexus of civil-military operations in complex environments.**

11. **Improve Crisis Decision-Making.** The consensus rule will remain fundamental to decision-making within the Alliance. The consensus rule is a necessary element of political cohesion and therefore a source of strength for the Alliance in the face of adversaries and competitors. Consensus in decision-making was effective for a 16 member Alliance faced with a unifying threat. Strategic Concept 2010 must consider new forms of decision-making within the Alliance during crises, at levels where the fundamental
political agreement of all is not critical to Alliance purpose and cohesion. The Secretary General has taken the lead in the crafting and drafting of Strategic Concept 2010; therefore recognizing the leadership role of the Secretary General during crises would seem reasonable. To reinforce the role of the Secretary General, a form of Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG), comprised of external advisors on fixed-term contracts, would add to the knowledge base and test planning assumptions and decisions which are vital in complex operations.

12. Modernize Communications and Decision-Making Tools. It is essential that NATO modernize and upgrade its capacity for taking decisions rapidly and effectively without impediments from antiquated hardware, software and protocols. This critical reform cannot wait until the new NATO Headquarters is completed. Already, ACT has experimented successfully with a NATO Strategic Overview (NSO) which permits faster and more reliable communication with all elements of NATO, civilian and military, while facilitating “parallel processing” in decision-making without changing the consensus principle.

13. Implement Decisions More Effectively. Strategic Concept 2010 must reflect a commitment to implement decisions in a more cohesive way, based on operational requirement, with forces available to the military commanders as required and with national caveats reduced to the absolute minimum. That will mean the acceptance of risks by all members with the clear objective of common engagement in any given theater of operation. Indeed, risk sharing on an equitable basis, related to a sense of common purpose in the face of threats, challenges and opportunities faced by all, must be a central aspect of the Alliance.

14. Balance Article 5 and Non-Article 5 Missions. The balance to be struck between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions must be considered. One challenge facing Strategic Concept 2010 concerns how best to enhance intervention and stabilization and reconstruction capacities, and the reconstitution of effective forces to defend all members in the event of a strategic shock. It is of considerable concern that non-U.S. NATO forces seem to have lost the ability to deploy above brigade level.

15. Enhance Military Effect and Strategic Judgments. The credibility of NATO is ultimately a function of military assets, capabilities, capacities and their effective organization. Effective Alliance strategic planning will thus be pivotal to a renewed Alliance. Planning must be reformed, based on the effective generation and sharing of critical information (intelligence), far better use of open sources and new knowledge partnerships, rapid diffusion (intelligence pooling and sharing), and sound decision-making structures at all levels (effective and flexible command and control). Strategic Concept 2010 must open the way for the thorough reconsideration of how capabilities should be best organized (task-sharing, specialization and defense integration).

16. Share Operational Costs. A system whereby “costs lie where they fall” places an inordinate financial burden on a few states that bear the brunt of operations. Moreover, the strain on personnel and equipment of a few states further adds to a sense of imbalance that is undermining Alliance unity of purpose and effort. Equally, at this time of acute pressure on the public finances of many NATO members, a common operational fund, while desirable in theory, is unlikely to be realized. However, it should still be sought in limited areas, such as operational deployments of the NATO Response Force and the (already agreed) purchase of strategic lift capacity.

17. Share In Kind Where Possible. NATO should explore a range of innovative ways to better share operational burdens in kind, such as a system for the sustained loaning of equipment and use of regular forces, reserves and volunteer reserves to assist the combat support services of states bearing the heaviest combat load. One area for consideration could be the establishment of a NATO Sinking Fund, whereby investment takes
place at times of reduced operational commitments, but is tapped when the operational tempo and intensity is particularly high.

18. **Win the Message – Crafting Effective Strategic Narratives.** Media and information management are now essential elements of sound campaign planning. Many lessons have been learned since 1999 about the critical role that an effective strategic narrative plays in supporting Alliance political objectives and military action. Whether in a theater of operation or at home, effective public diplomacy is pivotal to mission success at all levels. **Influence is an indispensable companion to firepower, and Strategic Concept 2010 must commit the Alliance to the conduct of public diplomacy that is far more effective than is generally the case today.** Therefore, “winning the message” will be an essential weapon in the NATO armory. Too often the Alliance has been behind the message in Afghanistan, thus ceding the initiative to adversaries such as the Taliban and even Al-Qaeda. To make NATO more news-nimble, a new approach to helping NATO get its message across in the media more effectively will be required. Commanders in the field will need to get the message out far more quickly, and journalists (from the world over) will need to be far more effectively embedded and make better use of new media.

19. **Balance Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control.** A new balance will need to be struck between confirming the role the three Alliance nuclear powers play in ensuring deterrence and the drive to reduce nuclear stockpiles further. **Nuclear policy and planning should remain firmly in the hands of London, Paris and Washington.** However, the Alliance as a whole has an important role to play in strengthening arms control efforts to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the very least, the Alliance must speak with one voice to forestall Iran from weaponizing its nuclear program and to support the efforts of President Obama to strengthen strategic and tactical nuclear weapons control regimes.

20. **Promote Defense Industrial Cooperation.** Where cooperation is possible, it must be promoted for the common good of all the allies and their security. Practical steps to promote transatlantic defense industrial cooperation should include the formation of an EU-NATO Long-Term Vision Working Group and strengthening of the Working Group on Capabilities, by harmonizing the work of the European Defense Agency and NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).

21. **Promote Security Outreach.** The Alliance will continue to play a role in Security Sector Reform (SSR); Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR); and Democratic Control over Armed Forces (DCAF). Training and advising partner armed forces will be an essential role for the Alliance. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) remains an important commitment. However, evidence from Afghanistan and Kosovo suggests that a “train-the-trainers” approach is likely to offer more benefits for partners, such as the UN and the AU. Moreover, given that some 4% of UN peacekeepers come from NATO members, a supporting role in better preparing UN forces for sanctioned missions is an important role for the Alliance.

22. **Modernize Defense Education.** With defense inflation running at between 4-6% per year and defense budgets of most members tight, it is unlikely that significantly greater numbers of boots or equipment will be generated over the life of this Strategic Concept. **A new knowledge base will be central to effectiveness and preparedness and should be reinforced by a commitment to strengthening the quality of individual members of Alliance forces through education and mentoring.** The modernization of defense education could be a major commitment in Strategic Concept 2010 that is both relevant and cost-effective, and NATO should be seen as leading the process and seeking cost-effective alternative solutions.

---

**An Alliance for a New Century**

Strategic Concept 2010 represents a search for consensus over the role of the Atlantic Alliance in a world transformed from that which existed at NATO’s founding in 1949. Strategic Concept 2010 is thus a critical statement of strategic intent at an important strategic moment. The new Strategic Concept is the vehicle to advance the modernization of the Alliance in the face of unclear yet systemic change. It should be seen as such and thus embrace big thinking. Indeed, 2010 is a world markedly different from that of 1999 when the last Strategic Concept was drafted. Strategic
Concept 2010 must inspire the organization of Western democratic military power in a world that will change rapidly between 2010 and 2020, precisely because NATO remains central to strategic change management. Strategic Concept 2010 represents a tipping point both in terms of the collective understanding of the environment and its effective management.

To that end, Strategic Concept 2010 must consider the identity of the Alliance in a multipolar world in which the role of other actors and institutions in security (e.g., UN, EU, OSCE and AU) will steadily take on importance. The process of agreeing a new Strategic Concept must demonstrate how an essential security contract is to be reestablished between leaders, practitioners and publics, thereby underpinning the purposes and missions of the Atlantic Alliance in a changing world. That will take honesty with publics and political courage of leaders.

Above all, Strategic Concept 2010 will need to communicate the necessity and utility of NATO, demonstrate where NATO adds value to an overall collective security effort and represent agreement between all members to all of the above. Realism and resolve must thus be the method of Strategic Concept 2010 so that all-important unity of purpose and effort can be forged even within the diversity that is the 21st century Atlantic Alliance. If Strategic Concept 2010 meets that challenge it will come to be seen as the new beginning the Alliance so desperately needs. If not, it shall be another false dawn.

Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer
April 2010
Appendix A: The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any...
of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
The Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors

CHAIRMAN
*Chuck Hagel

CHAIRMAN, ATLANTIC COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD
General Brent Scowcroft

PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe

CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
*Henry E. Catto

VICE CHAIRS
*Richard Edelman
*Brian C. McK. Henderson
*Franklin D. Kramer
*Richard L. Lawson
*Virginia A. Mulberger
*W. DeVier Pierson

TREASURERS
*Ronald M. Freeman
*John D. Macomber

SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe

DIRECTORS
*Robert J. Abernethy
Timothy D. Adams
Carol C. Adelman
Michael A. Almond
*Michael Ansari
*David D. Aufhauser
Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Donald K. Bandler
Lisa B. Barry
Thomas L. Blair
Susan M. Blaustein
*Julia Chang Bloch
Harold Brown
Dan W. Burns
R. Nicholas Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
Sarah C. Carey
Michael P.C. Carns
*Daniel W. Christman
Wesley K. Clark
Susan Blaustein

CHAIRMAN
*Chuck Hagel

CHAIRMAN, ATLANTIC COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD
General Brent Scowcroft

PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe

CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
*Henry E. Catto

VICE CHAIRS
*Richard Edelman
*Brian C. McK. Henderson
*Franklin D. Kramer
*Richard L. Lawson
*Virginia A. Mulberger
*W. DeVier Pierson

TREASURERS
*Ronald M. Freeman
*John D. Macomber

SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe

DIRECTORS
*Robert J. Abernethy
Timothy D. Adams
Carol C. Adelman
Michael A. Almond
*Michael Ansari
*David D. Aufhauser
Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Donald K. Bandler
Lisa B. Barry
Thomas L. Blair
Susan M. Blaustein
*Julia Chang Bloch
Harold Brown
Dan W. Burns
R. Nicholas Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
Sarah C. Carey
Michael P.C. Carns
*Daniel W. Christman
Wesley K. Clark

L. Kevin Kelly
*James V. Kimsey
*Roger Kirk
Henry A. Kissinger
Philip Lader
Anthony Lake
Muslim Lakhani
Robert G. Liberatore
Henrik Liljegren
*Jan M. Lodal
Izzat Majeed
Wendy W. Makins
William E. Mayer
Barry R. McCaffrey
James P. McCarthy
Eric D.K. Melby
Jack N. Merritt
Franklin C. Miller
*Judith A. Miller
Alexander V. Mirtchev
*George E. Moose
William A. Nilze
Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Philip A. Odeen
Ana Palacio
Torkel L. Patterson
William J. Perry
*Thomas R. Pickering
Andrew Prozes
Arnold L. Punaro
Joseph W. Ralston
Norman W. Ray
Teresa M. Ressel
Joseph E. Robert, Jr.
Jeffrey A. Rosen
Charles O. Rossotti
Stanley Roth
Michael L. Ryan
Marjorie M. Scardino
William O. Schmieder
John P. Schmilz
Jill A. Schuker
Matthew R. Simmons
Kiron K. Skinner
*Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Richard J.A. Steele
Philip Stephenson
*Paula Stern
John Studzinski
William H. Taft, IV
Peter J. Tanous
Peter Thomas
Paul Twomey
Henry G. Ulrich, III
Enzo Viscusi
Carl E. Vuono
Charles F. Wald
Jay Walker
Mark R. Warner
J. Robinson West
John C. Whitehead
David A. Wilson
Macej Witucki
R. James Woolsey
Dov S. Zakheim
Anthony C. Zinni

HONORARY DIRECTORS
David C. Acheson
Madeleine K. Albright
James A. Baker, III
Frank C. Carlucci, III
Warren Christopher
Colin L. Powell
Condoleezza Rice
Edward L. Rowny
James R. Schlesinger
George P. Shultz
John Warner
William H. Webster

LIFETIME DIRECTORS
Lucy Wilson Benson
Daniel J. Callahan, III
Geraldine S. Kunstadter
Steven Muller
Stanley R. Resor
William Y. Smith
Ronald P. Verdichio
Togo D. West, Jr.

*members of the Executive Committee

Board list current as of April, 2010
The Atlantic Council is a non-partisan organization that promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the global challenges of the 21st century.