

Shuja Nawaz: And thank you for coming so early in the morning, Cameron. I was just talking about maybe 9:00 is a bit too early for Washington, but I think the determined people have shown up and we're very grateful. Thank you. For those of you that don't know me, I'm Shuja Nawaz. I'm the director of the South Asia Center, and on behalf of my colleagues and our president Fred Kemp, I want to welcome all of you to this very special event. It's been quite a while since we've been trying to get Ambassador Munter to come back into the public eye and to come and speak, and I'm delighted that he agreed to do so.

The topic, of course, as you know, is U.S.-Pakistan relations, and we thought it would be useful to hear from him, as the most recently returned U.S. ambassador in Pakistan, to look back, particularly, I think, at the tumultuous events of 2011 and after that, and then see what lessons can be drawn for moving forward. We hope that this will be one of many conversations on Pakistan that we are trying to focus on this year, which is a very important year of transitions in Pakistan, with the upcoming spring elections, the presidential elections in the summer, and then changes in the military leadership in the fall, followed by the change at the helm at the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

So suddenly it's like those country dances all change. And so they'll be all changed there, and potentially on the other side of the water, in India, an election next year, which may be brought forward if the events lead it to an early election, and then of course, changes in Afghanistan, which affect Pakistan and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deeply. I don't want to go into great detail about introducing Ambassador Munter, but you know that he was ambassador in Pakistan, that he left last July, and then resigned from the Foreign Service in September. He has been **[inaudible]** starting this summer.

So he's gainfully employed, and hopefully will be coming back to Washington frequently. He has had, prior to his posting, a strong amount of experience in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, where he was first political military minister councilor, then as DCM for the first half of 2010. He was ambassador in Belgrade from 2007 to 2009. And in 2006, he led the first PRT in **[inaudible]** in Iraq. He's also had various important assignments at headquarters in Foggy Bottom. His other domestic assignments, just so that you have an idea, include the country director for Czechoslovakia, the

Department of State and the Dean Rusk Fellow at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

So with that, I would like to welcome Ambassador Munter. He's going to speak for about 20 minutes, and then we will get ready for some questions and answers, and hopefully a rich conversation, with this extremely rich audience in terms of its experience. Thank you. Ambassador.

Cameron Munter: Well, thank you. Thank you for getting up early in the morning. And I'm delighted to be at the Atlantic Council. It takes me back to the days when I worked in the 1990s on NATO enlargement. And we used to try to figure where would NATO enlargement end. Because many of the purists in NATO would say it has to be a country of the North Atlantic, and these countries that we were talking about in Central Europe don't touch the North Atlantic. So we made a rule that the Atlantic Council should be concerned about any country that has a border that touches water that touches the Atlantic. So Karachi counts, and so it's within the purview of NATO, the Atlantic Council, and that whole world.

One of the reminders it's an issue that really is a worldwide issue, not just a regional one. With the new – Shuja mentioned the changes that are taking place in Pakistan – and for those of us who are not living in Washington anymore, there are also the changes that are taking place here, that I think are important. And I think that the fact that we have, even though the extraordinary commitment that Secretary Clinton made to Pakistan, had an enormous effect and a mitigating effect on many of the difficulties that people like me and others, I think many of whom are in the audience, experienced in 2010 through 2012.

The fact that we have John **Carey** coming in, a man who knows Pakistan well and cares deeply about Pakistan, is something that can cheer us somewhat. And when I say Pakistan, I'm always hoping that he and his team will look regionally, that they'll look at South Asia, Pakistan within the context of South Asia, and redefining it. I had the chance to write a piece that came out last week in *The Atlantic* that talked about some of the issues of today, and before going into some of the specifics that may be of interest to you now that I'm no longer working for the U.S. government that I can talk about from 2011, just some of the themes though that I wanted to repeat from that, that I think are very important.

The first is that I do think that we, in the wake of the difficulties that we had, kind of what I've described at other times as either hitting bottom or rolling down the side of a ravine with the cactus and the stones kind of scraping us as we went downhill over the time when I was ambassador. And I hasten to add that, as soon as I left, things seemed to get better. So that's good. I want you to know that I appreciate that. But during that time, when we did hit bottom, one of the things that we needed to do was to figure out whether we could talk with one another about security issues. So the first category, the basket if you will, of security issues.

I'm optimistic that there is a mechanism in place that will allow that. And what that mechanism, I think, requires, is that we avoid a tradition of stove-piping, bureaucratic stove-piping that exists on both sides. It's not as strong, I think, as many critics have said. It's not as extreme. You know, people in the ISI do talk to people in the Foreign Ministry. People in the President's Office in Pakistan do talk to people in the Parliament. Of course these things happen. Similarly, when people claim in Washington that the CIA believes X and the State Department believes Y, I think those of you who are from these institutions realize it just doesn't quite work that way.

There are many opinions going through all of these institutions, and whether someone is hardline or soft-line on a particular issue, is not defined by the institution in which that person works. But in order to avoid the kind of insularity that we sometimes run across, in the time that I was there, I think that the leaders on both sides have recognized that having more people in the room during discussions is very important.

And so I bring to your attention, and I emphasize, that what I hope has continued is what we call the three-on-three meetings that take place, the meetings in which representatives on both sides from the military, from the intelligence community, and from the civilian leadership in both countries actually sit and talk about the key elements of the counterterrorism, and the cooperation for a long-term military solution in the region. The reason that's so important is that any kinds of agreements that take place have to stick, and they have to stick throughout the bureaucracies of both countries.

And what I hope is that that set of meetings that was initiated in the difficult days of late 2011 has continued. If that's the case, then the more difficult issues that come up, that is reconciliation, the

role of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan in this reconciliation process. The role that other countries in the region, such as Iran or India, may play in the future of Afghanistan. The questions of the tools that are used in the fight against terrorism, such as the vaunted D word, the drones. What tools are the people who are fighting against a common enemy going to use in common, in a way that's acceptable to both sides, so that the kind of tensions that come up about counterterrorism can be avoided?

Those kinds of issues, in my mind, can only be dealt with in a group that's large enough that the solutions that are made are not seen as solutions that are done behind the back or over the heads of others. So if that mechanism can continue, I think there's room for optimism in the counterterrorism, in the security area. Secondly, the other critique, or at least observation I'd like to make, is that I think we have to be honest about the difficulties, about the failures that we've had in our assistance program. And in this, I'm a little tougher, I think, on the Pakistanis than the Americans.

Whereas I think we have certain amounts of soul searching to do about the short-term emphasis of some of our counterterrorism policies, I think the Pakistanis have a little soul searching – and by them, I mean the Pakistanis in power, the Pakistanis in the press, the Pakistanis in the military – need to stop blaming America for its perceived failure to fix Pakistan. There has to be, as Adam Thompson, the British High Commissioner said recently, in a fairly hard-hitting interview that I think was very admirable, there has to be reform for any of the efforts by Pakistan's friends, to really take hold.

He was speaking specifically of education, but the same thing is true in the key areas which we have had as our priorities, in assistance in Pakistan, whether it's energy, whether it's job creation, whether it's special projects to try to bring prosperity and coherence to the **Fahta**, whether it's education, or whether it's health. These were the areas in our assistance program, in the **Carey, Lubert, Berman** process. And you notice Carey, Lubert and Berman are all gone now. It's a sad day. But in that process of putting together an ambitious and very idealistic program for the civilian government after 2008, the promise or the perceived promise has not been met.

We have to be honest about that. But it's not going to be met if we're looking forward rather than ascribing blame. It's not going

to be met unless there is significant reform in Pakistan. And I'm of the opinion, now that I'm post-government, that I think that we really do have to take seriously the voices who say that the assistance program is just not really something we can pursue in the manner we've pursued in the past, unless there is leadership from Pakistan. For us to go in as we have done in the past, to design very ambitious new projects in education, for us to go in and try to add megawatts to the grid in Pakistan – adding megawatts to the grid is not the solution to the energy problem in Pakistan.

It's the reform of the energy sector in Pakistan, through which those new megawatts can be more efficiently used that is the issue there. And so while I think we have some thinking and reassessing to do in that first category of counterterrorism, especially as the year 2014 looms large in our own domestic calculations, I think Pakistan, in order to salvage the remaining goodwill which is still there and the money that is still there, money that as far as I know, is still supported by bipartisan leadership in Congress because of the understanding that Pakistan is important.

For it to have an effect, Pakistan is going to have to take a hard look at its ability to lead in the area of reforms that will make the assistance have an impact and allow those Americans who are committed to Pakistan's future, to be able to argue credibly that this is worth the money that we're spending. If we're able to do those two things, if we're able to see a reasonable discussion in Pakistan, perhaps with a new government in this this year, about assistance and the role of assistance in economic growth, if we're able to see the continued broad counterterrorism discussion, I think that sets the stage for us to have a new phase of a less fervent perhaps than maybe Richard Holbrook would have wanted, but a more realistic kind of optimism about the way that we deal with Pakistan and South Asia.

With these two elements, I have two other things to suggest, which have to do with getting past the tyranny that I see of the problem of negative narratives between Pakistan and America. No secret to those of you who've worked in Pakistan that most Pakistanis across the board will say Americans by their very nature, by their DNA, are the kind of people who come in, use Pakistan and then discard Pakistan when we're done with Pakistan. So this is so deeply held as a belief that it gets in the way actually of people really looking at problems the way they out to, in a reasonable

way, and just it becomes kind of predictive as a way that Americans act.

It's a bigotry. It's a lazy way of thinking. And as long as Pakistanis do it, they're going to cripple the relationship. For our part, we have the same problem. We say, "We give these guys money. Why don't they do what we want?" And I remember a quote from Newt Gingrich on how stupid do these guys think we are? If we have that kind of dismissive attitude, that we can give people money and they're going to love us, that we can give people money and somehow that means that they're going to think the way we think, that's equally stupid. That's equally as lazy.

We have to get past our own prejudice, our own bilateral narrative that does get in the way. And by this, I'm not talking about experts. I'm just talking about the general public's view of the other country. I don't think you can do this. I don't think you can discard these by some intellectual exercise or by some paper that's dealt with at a deputy's meeting in the National Security Council. As much as I love Washington, I don't think everything can be solved at a meeting among the bureaucrats in Washington. I think there's two ways in which we should try to look beyond that. One is conceptually, to try whenever we can, to look at those questions that have been defined bilaterally.

The questions of assistance, the questions of security that I've mentioned, and any others. And try as hard as we can to put them at a regional context. What that does for us is help break down the kind of viceroy obsession, the idea that everything the Americans do, everything the Americans think, is going to be what defines the country. It brings in other players. It makes it messier. But I think what Mark Grossman and Secretary Clinton were trying to do, at least in the economic sphere, is something that we should think hard about expanding.

We should try to figure out whether a country like China, that when you really get down to it, has fairly similar interests in Pakistan to ours – which is not true everywhere in the world, but I think it is in Pakistan – whether or not we want to make a broader effort to work with China, to get that higher on our agenda with China, to bring the additional power to bear on saying to Pakistan – you know, when Pakistanis used to say to me, "If you don't do X, we'll turn to the Chinese." And I say blessed is Pakistan that

you have the two most powerful friends in the world, China and America.

Why not have us be your friends together? Now this may not be possible. It may be that that's just too difficult structurally for American policymakers. It may be too difficult conceptually for Pakistanis to accept that America and China could work together. But the Chinese ambassador, when I was in Pakistan, told me, you know, China has two, according to him, China has two interests in Pakistan. One is to protect its investments, and one is to prevent the spread of radical Islam into Western China. And I thought, what's wrong with that? How is that so different from what we want, if we're saying that we would like to stop the spread of radical Islam to protect the homeland, and that we would like to see a prosperous and stable Pakistan in the region.

It's not that different. So if we are able to work with China, if we are able to, in other words, think of Pakistan differently, if we are able to work with Turkey on China – Turkey is one of those countries greatly admired, as you know, by most Pakistanis, especially those with progressive feelings. If we're able to try to say there is something about the way that the Turks deal with Pakistan, maybe a style, that we may benefit from, that we may be able to work together on, that this can strengthen the kind of reform that we are calling for. Not just bilaterally, but with the Turks.

Once again, if the opening towards India continues, and I remain cautiously optimistic that the small steps, the confidence-building measures that are taking place, can succeed – I hope they will succeed – that we'll be able to find a day where we're not just talking about onions and cement going across the border, where we're not just talking about visas for students, but we're talking about the day when perhaps the general staff of Pakistan can sit down and talk with the general staff of India or its equivalent, not just about the barbed wire at **Waga** Crossing, but about a common vision of what's going to happen in Afghanistan.

Which I believe does not happen at this point. But there's no reason why it shouldn't. And those kinds of regional elements, I think, could strengthen our ability to convince Pakistanis, and convince ourselves, that the way out of these problems which have bedeviled Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations for so long, are somehow going to be solved by a broad new clever U.S.-Pakistan

bilateral plan. So that's one suggestion I have, is that as much as we can, those things, not just water issues, which are regional, not just environmental issues, which are important and which can continue to be worked on regionally, but other issues as well, we should try to see them when we can in a regional context.

Secondly, I think it would be wise for all of us, those of us who are ex-government, but certainly those still in the government, to look at where we have advantages of institutions that are not government. We do a lot here, but we can do much more. I mean as long as people are afraid, thanks to the State Department travel advisory, as long as people are afraid to go to Pakistan – and by people, I'm speaking of those who are businessmen or academics or people in the third sector, in NGOs, who don't know a lot about Pakistan, but are people of goodwill and are fascinated by the country.

They often run up against the fear, the way Pakistan is painted in the world, that it's – if you go to Pakistan, you're going to die. So don't go. That will take a lot of time, but I think continuing to urge these people in the other sectors to address Pakistani issues in the most creative way possible, perhaps regionally, but in any way, is really important. The face of America, in my opinion, that Pakistanis admire, is our economic vitality, our academic institutions, our tradition of philanthropy, which as you know – I mean there's a huge tradition of philanthropy in Pakistan, and the links between our philanthropic traditions are not very well developed and could be developed much more.

Those elements are not what people are thinking about when we get a 5 percent approval rating. When we have a 5 percent approval rating or a 6 percent or a 4 percent or whatever the number is, it's almost exclusively, whether it's correctly understood, as a response to our security policies and our regional security issues. So that putting our best foot forward, putting our best image forward, would involve bringing players into the relationship who maybe have not spent as much time as they should have. Bringing the Gates Foundation more deeply, not just into polio vaccinations, but more deeply into Pakistan.

To find partners in the Pakistani philanthropic sector. Bringing American businesses who are not there yet, into Pakistan, not because they're doing charity for Pakistan. Businessmen don't do that. Businessmen invest because they can make money. There is

money to be made. And I think the way to do that is to become familiar with the opportunities that have been pent up there for a very long time. Reviving the relationships that those of you who have worked on Pakistan for many years remember. I'm out in California these days at Pomona College. Pomona, the goddess of fruit, right?

The University of California Agricultural Extension has a long relationship with universities like [inaudible], where they have the citrus specialty, or the desert farming or the green revolution institutions that have come up throughout Pakistan. Just the State of California alone, if these were revived, UC Davis, UC Riverside, these would bring Pakistani leaders back into the mainstream, and bring American leaders, non-governmental leaders, back in contact with a country of great potential.

And if we can play those kinds of cards, get those kinds of people back together, that, I think, will lead to the kind of intellectual ferment and reform that will help Pakistan break out of what I consider to be a general kind of isolation, an attitude towards economics that isn't as global as it should be. So once again, other non-governmental institutions, as much as we can, rather than defining the relationship as we have unfortunately done too often in the recent years, strictly as a security relationship. Let me end my part of the talk here by just a quick discussion of the issues of 2011 that I think, if you have questions, I'll do my best to answer and deal with.

I mean when we had – when Richard Holbrook was still alive and there was still the idea that we were going to build on the Carey, Lubert, Berman legislation and support the government, or be able to support what we hoped would be a progressive set of moves by the new civilian government, we got out too far ahead of ourselves in trying to make sure that at the same time, we built our short-term concerns about counterterrorism too strongly.

One of the accidents waiting to happen because of the flood of interest in counterterrorism, was the Raymond Davis case, and as you know, this was an opportunity for people like me to get a crash course in **Sharia** law, so that Raymond Davis was out of the country, not because we were so clever in applying the Vienna Convention, but because the people who were the survivors of the two street thugs who he killed, forgave him under Sharia law. And

I hasten to add, for those who don't know, that this would not have been possible without the help of the ISI.

So as we demonize sometimes, the ISI, as double dealing in this narrative of Pakistan perfidy, Raymond Davis would not be free, and we would not be free of this crisis, had it not been for ISI help. And we should remember that. ISI's not perfect, but neither is it the demon that some people make it out to be. Secondly, Mike Nagata, who was my advisor, at that time a brigadier general, now a major general, who is going down to Tampa to do some very important job, I guess, Mike Nagata used to come into the staff meetings during 2011 and say, "Well, what else could possibly go wrong?" with a big smile on his face.

And what went wrong next was the decision we had to make about the Osama bin Laden raid, which, if asked again, I would give the same answer I gave before, which is it was necessary for us to do it without talking to the Pakistanis, for security reasons, to keep it secret. But we paid a terrible price for it because we made the Pakistanis, specifically those Pakistanis who had invested in us, people like General Kayani, we made him pay a terrible price for the fact that he was not brought in by his erstwhile American allies, into this decision. People still ask me how could they have not known.

Well, my way of measuring how the Pakistani leadership in the military and the intelligence didn't know, is if all of that material that the SEAL team swept up in those big plastic bags in [inaudible], which was variously described as enough information to have a small university library, or something like this. If there had been information in there that had linked the senior levels of the military or intelligence to a knowledge that bin Laden had been there, I'm certain it would have leaked. You'll be surprised that there are leaks from the U.S. government at times. But I'm convinced that the proof that they didn't know at the senior levels is that we have not seen the leak, the smoking gun that links them.

But our way of handling that, by beating our breast and saying out in front of the public that you are either complicit or incompetent, was painful because it was true. But when you rub people's face in that kind of thing, it does make relationships harder. So that painful element, the issue of the bin Laden raid, I guess the lessons I would like to take from that are that we should not assume that the leadership of Pakistan, that military and intelligence leadership

knows everything, much to its chagrin, and we should also not assume that when we crow about it, that it doesn't have an impact. It does have an impact.

Finally, I think the event towards the end of the year, after Mike Mullins' testimony, after other things had taken place, the **Salala** incident was once again one of those terrible things that showed that sometimes in America we do tend to look internally at a time when state-craft or at least generosity might be called for. From the Pakistani point of view, those of you who know what happened in Salala, may not know that it was an AC130 gun ship that was called in to support the special operations troops from NATO who had crossed the border, erroneously thinking there was not a border post there. When they were fired upon, the Pakistanis believed they were firing upon someone who was encroaching on their territory.

The Americans believed that they were being fired on by someone who was not supposed to be there. We came in with an AC130 gun ship, and an AC130 gun ship does not shoot bullets. It shoots projectiles. So when we killed those 24 soldiers, we obliterated them. And it's not just a question of different cultures. When there is no trace of people who you've killed, it is seen as overkill. It is seen as incommensurate response. And I don't think that point was ever quite understood on our side. That it was not a question of, but they shot first, or we didn't make a mistake. In fact, we didn't make the kind of mistake – we didn't have the premeditated attack that many of the more rabid members of the press in Pakistan accuse us of.

It wasn't done on purpose to kick Pakistan in the teeth, to teach anyone a lesson. But when that terrible kind of mistake takes place, and it is perceived widely as an overreaction, it is very important that we consider how we talk to the Pakistani people about how sorry we are. And the fact that we were unable to say that we were sorry until July cost our country literally billions of dollars by having us get the supply lines to Afghanistan closed down, and putting us into a warm embrace with our new friend Vladimir Putin, to supply our troops in Afghanistan.

But worse than that, it showed the kind of callousness that makes it so difficult simply to begin to talk about those things that I've always tried to stress, which is those things we have in common. Because if you don't have in common that you're sorry when there

is nothing left of the bodies of 24 of your boys, then it's very hard for many people, especially those people who want a relationship with us. I'm not talking about those people on the far fringes of society who are against our role there. I'm talking about those who want to be our friends.

It's very hard for them to defend us to their peers, which is ultimately where the game is. Much as we have brilliant people in public diplomacy, who are countering violent extremism and doing a great job of getting out and talking, the real guts of our relationship, or the understanding of our relationship with Pakistan is what Pakistanis say to Pakistanis. And if they think that we don't care, and if we demonstrate that, we're just not going to get past this. So I hope that the elements that I've suggested, a broader view of things, a regional view, and especially bringing other players into the mix, can help us get away from the kind of mistakes that we made in 2011, that drove Pakistan to conclude, rightly or wrongly, that we were callous, that we didn't care.

And in fact, just the people here, we do care. We may not care always in the same way as Pakistan. We're never going to have the exact same strategic goals. But we care enough that we can't afford to have those kinds of incidents get in the way of what happened to us in the past. So with that, what I'd like to do is end my part of this discussion, and take it on the chin from those of you who have other ways of seeing things, and want to contribute. So Shuja, can we move to that? Thanks.

Shuja Nawaz:

[Inaudible] so we don't cut off our friends on the left over here. Is that the fashionable thing to be now? I've already started taking down some names of people that want to ask questions. But please remind me as we go along. Thank you very much. I think this was just what we wanted from somebody who was in the trenches in **[inaudible]**, and look back and we look forward to see what can be done. You mentioned one word very briefly, the dreaded D word. So maybe I'll start by asking you about that. Yes, the number of attacks have gone up. Yes, even though all the information has not been shared with the American public or with any public for that matter, the assumption is that the attacks are much more sharper, pinpointed.

Perhaps they have better intelligence on the ground assisting them. And that the techniques being used are very precise. But is the

United States winning the tactical battle and losing the war in the region as a result of this?

Cameron Munter: Right. One of the things that one does when one works for the U.S. government is sign pieces of paper about nondisclosure. So if I appear to be dancing around this topic, it's on purpose. So you'll have to forgive me about that. You raise, I think, what is the key question. Two elements of the answer I'd like to give are that first of all, there is the question of the American public's need to know about this issue. And then there is the question of the effectiveness in policy of the drones. I don't feel I can go into the mechanics of how the process works. It's not something I can do. But on the question of the need to have a clear understanding of what the drones do, I think that there is a fairly broad consensus that the way that we talk about drones leads to speculation that is not helpful because there's not enough information for the public.

And a lot of the people in the press have pursued this, and I think at a certain point, someone like John **Brennan**, should he be confirmed, who is a very thoughtful man, and cares, I think, deeply – but he's been somewhat demonized, I think, by the press – but I think he's very thoughtful on this issue, will probably come up with suggestions that will allow the informed public to in fact be informed. To know what it is that we're trying to deal with with the drones. Because I think that ultimately, this is one tool in a toolbox of methods, kind of an array of options, that both the Pakistanis and the Americans have. That is, there are ways to deal with terrorists that use the technology that the drone has.

There are ways to deal with terrorists that maybe are more effectively dealt with by the intelligence agencies in Pakistan, things that soldiers on the ground can do that no drone can do. The estrangement that we had during the period 2010 through 2012 got in the way of our cooperation and our ability, in my opinion, to try to have the division of labor that was most fruitful. Where people who know things about say militant networks in **Nefata** can try to get together Americans, Pakistanis and others and say, "What is the best way? What is the most effective way to deal with this problem, using all the tools at hand?"

As we diverged, there was more of a tendency to have different types of methods functioning without coordination so that the drone attacks became, in my opinion, probably less effective because they were not part of an overall counterterrorism effort. I

think that talking about it publicly in a mature way and talking about it with the Pakistanis in a comprehensive way, which I would like to think is something that we are repairing now, is going to help that. I think that our ability to coordinate in the future is not going to be reached by focusing on drones themselves.

It's going to be through that same three-on-three structure, through the cooperation that we have, that allows us to put these kinds of questions in the proper focus. What can drones do and what don't they do? What can other elements do and what don't they do? So that's kind of the direction I wanted to answer.

Shuja Nawaz: From the things that you describe, it appears that at least for the time being, the United States appears to be pursuing an improvement in the transactional relationship. Is there any real possibility that this can be replaced in the near future with some kind of an ideological understand or a strategic understanding of the relationship for the longer run and Pakistan's role in the region?

Cameron Munter: During my time there in the summer of 2011, a very senior Pakistani general, after I had come to him talking about some of the problems he had, he said, "Cameron, what you're trying to tell me is that we're down to a transactional relationship." And I said, "General, if we can get up to a transactional relationship, I'd be very happy." And I don't mean that idly. I think that when you don't trust each other, when the events that take place undercut trust, transactional is about as good as you can hope for. And transactional in the sense, you know, it's become kind of a dirty word. You use us and we use you. Actually transactional can be quite a good word, which is we are as transparent as we can be.

It's like a contract. You buy this car, you get this car, you get all four tires, etc. So I wouldn't be in such a hurry to leave transactional behind because what transactional means to me is that you're being transparent and you're being honest, and you're being clear about what you're doing. The danger with going beyond that to the ideological friendship, is that it seems to me – and those of you who have worked in Pakistan longer may know this better than I – that we have a habit of jumping back into what seems to be a certain affinity, certain things that we sense that we have in common, is immediately assumed to be a total agreement of views, that we very rapidly jump from one step to another.

And I found this in any number of instances, where we would say we want to work on a set of projects. Do we agree? Yes, we do. Therefore, we are totally in agreement. Without taking the step-by-step process of saying, "In which ways do we actually differ in putting together our goals?" The best example I can think of this was our attempt to try to talk about reconciliation, where we sat down with the Pakistanis and talked about the future of Afghanistan. You know, the famous Kayani 3.0 paper and all of the efforts made to try to define what the end game in Afghanistan was.

And we simply – how do I describe this? We simply weren't able to connect on that question of where we wanted to go in Afghanistan. I think it might have been more fruitful had we said, "Here are the two or three steps we might take. Here are the two or three groups we might focus on. Here are kind of the more concrete elements of what we were doing." Rather than trying to go all the way to say, "Here is the picture, the conceptual agreement we had of the way, say Afghanistan is going to look in 2016." We shot all the way for the end, rather than just trying to work our way through.

So I guess I'm less of a fan of, having gone through two wonderful years in Pakistan, I'm less of a fan of trying to find the places where we agree totally, and trying to find those elements where there is the seed in specific areas where we can work part-time.

Shuja Nawaz: I'm not sure car pricing is the best symbol of this because there's something called Detroit pricing, and then what you get from Japanese car makers. So perhaps we can find a better way of describing the relationship.

Cameron Munter: Yes. We have to watch our metaphors, don't we?

Shuja Nawaz: Yes. We now open it up to the audience. And again, thank you for raising your hands. I've taken some names down already. I'm going to start here. When the microphone reaches you, please identify yourself because we are taping this for people who couldn't make it, so we can put it on our website. And please ask your question. If you have a comment, please identify it as a comment, please.

Francis Cook: My name is Francis Cook. I'm also a recovering ambassador. Thank you very much for your very thoughtful comments on a

very complicated relationship. I want to refer to something that happened on your watch that you didn't mention, then tie it to one of your recommendations. In the Pak press at least, the fact that the agency used a doctor to try to get UBL's DNA has been tied to the assassination of the 12 polio vaccinators. Your recommendation, which I think is a very good one, that American NGOs, specifically our biggest one, the Gates Foundation, get more involved with the really very excellent Pakistani sort of human welfare organization – I recall a huge one in **Karachi** when I visited – is a good one.

But given what **[inaudible]** said this weekend in an article he circulated, the almost lack of interest in the Pakistani in protecting NGOs who are out doing good work, why should American NGOs try to do more in Pakistan? And maybe how can they try to do more if they're not even going to be protected by the government that they're out there basically doing social work for, that the government can't do itself? Thank you.

Cameron Munter: Very good point. I think that maybe – I haven't thought this through – but maybe there are kind of two categories here we're talking about for, the work that needs to be done by or that could be done by NGOs. Traditionally, and by traditionally I go back to the Stone Age of 2008. I mean I'm not going – the idea of the American commitment to the long-term stability of Pakistan, which was the more Carey, Lubert, Berman vision, that was to balance the amount of money that we were putting into the military, I think was meant to have an immediate impact for both countries. That is not only to show Pakistan that we were not going to fall into the narrative of leaving, but that we were in it for the long haul.

We were giving them the engagement ring. We were really there. And we wanted to show results quickly. Similarly, we wanted to show our Congress that if it was going to invest this kind of money, that there were going to be results quickly. And that led us to, understandably, to engage and to fund and to encourage not only USAID projects, but other third sector projects that would have an immediate impact. One of them was the polio campaign, especially in the Fahta region in KPK, that was meant to really change the way people thought. That's one kind of work that you can do. The kind I was talking about more when I was beginning my talk was a much longer-term question.

Which I can't say I want to back away from this first category, but I'm much more talking about the effort to try to build relations in settled Pakistan, between those institutions that are there and are strong, those peers, for example, who are feeding thousands of people, those people who are building schools in Punjab, and try to get that relationship, to strengthen that relationship with those institutions in the United States, who are not on the forefront of dealing with these very immediate questions of how to deal with polio in Fahta, for example. I never really have thought of this as two categories before, so I'm struggling a little bit as I answer your question.

But I think that there's no good answer to someone who wants to do the kind of very meaningful, but very dangerous work that you mentioned, and fears that the government is either not capable or not interested in protecting them. But that to me is not the universe, the entire universe of NGO work. Important as it is, I think that is going to depend sorrowfully more on our ability to come to a good outcome in Afghanistan, a good counterterrorism relationship with the country, and tougher kinds of issues that are more political. I was speaking more about the long-term investment in other parts of Pakistan, so that the people who work in foundations don't have – much as I love [Ahmed Rashid](#), the guy drives me nuts by putting flames all over his books, and using words like abyss and danger and stuff.

There are great parts of Pakistan, as you know, where people aren't getting shot every day. Just like there's parts of Los Angeles where people are not getting shot every day. And I would like to think we can not only do our best to stave off disaster, but to put a lot of our effort into those areas that are maybe quieter, longer term, and build the kind of relationship that in the long run is, I think, going to have more of an impact than the immediate stuff we tried to do post-2008. I don't mean to denigrate those efforts at all because they were brave and they were important.

But to me, I think there's a longer-term question. We're talking in terms of decades, of building relationships in, I guess I'll use the term settled Pakistan. So that we have friends and institutions that are strong enough to deal with public health, to deal with political reform, to deal with the broader questions that unfortunately during my tenure, weren't working very well. Does that make sense? It's a different kind of emphasis in getting – if I wanted to get the leaders of different foundations out there, I want them to go to

Lahor and not necessarily to go out and have their picture taken at the Khyber Pass.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. Just for all of those that have raised their hands, there was a photo finish, so I'm trying to do my best to make sure I get the questions from different parts of the room. So can we go ahead, please?

Arnold Zyplen: Thank you. My name is Arnold **Zyplen**, and I opened the first Associated Press Bureau in Pakistan in what looks like, from now, the Golden Age, in the '70s. Throughout your discussion and some of your writing, you refer quite often to Pakistani leadership. And the question I want to raise is, who actually does lead in Pakistan? Who does the deciding, where does the power to move Pakistan rest? Or is there no one or no institution that is really in control?

Cameron Munter: Pretty enormous question, and I think books have been written by people wiser than me about those kinds of issues. But I would only speculate, just on a couple of elements of this. I'm convinced that when people try to say that there's one locus of power in Pakistan, they make a mistake. You can go to **Raul Pindi** and try to find those people who are probably the leaders in national security issues, and you're likely to find them there. But I don't think it's accurate to say that economic long-term questions are dictated by the military to the civilians. To varying degrees, there's elements of decentralization, whether it's in business, whether it's regional power.

The kingpins of Punjab or the kingpins of **Sind** are not simply taking orders. We should not assume that there's somehow – and I'm not accusing of this – but somehow a very efficient authoritarian state where someone at the top is giving orders. Right? So take the world of national security, yes, I would say that there's been a tendency for us not to want to believe that we can solve all problems by going to Raul Pindi. But we ignore the military at our peril if it's a national security issue, right? That said, what we like to see, and what I think Pakistani leadership – and by that, I mean both the elected civilian leaders and the civil servants and the military and the business leaders, etc.

What they've tried to do is figure out ways – and I give them credit for trying – figure out ways to try to have military and civil relations that somehow are more balanced. So that when you get

to questions like how the elections are being run or the constitutional issues that the chief justice is so often talking about, I'm not sure it's that fruitful to go and ask the generals what they think about those issues. I'm not sure they're the ones running it. What's dissatisfying about all this is that we have that tendency to say, "Pakistan is kind of in a post-Westphalian diplomatic idea. Here's Pakistan the State. Who do you ask?" There isn't really anyone, and so you have different groups you need to go to.

And I would hope that what the embassy that I worked in, and I'm sure that the embassy now still is the same, is you have to talk to a hell of a lot of people to try to get some notion of who's doing what at what time, from the business community to the leaders of the provinces, where a number, since the amendments that have been passed to the constitution, a number of the competencies have been shoved down to the provinces. So that to really get at the question of public health and get at the question of education, you have to be talking to the leadership in Lahor and the leadership in – the civilian leadership in Lahor or in Karachi.

So I guess I have to throw the question back at you, it's really complicated. It's really hard to say how do you deal with these issues because there is not one Pakistan. There are a series, a thicket that I guess you could best describe by someone like [Anatole Leavin](#) in his book about the competing social groups that keep things stable, and yet are not always responsive to democratic impulses. And those of us who want to think that as Americans we're supporting the strengthening of democracy, we also want to get things done. So how do you get something done legally, with a group of people who are not always able, through democratic processes, to have the impact they want?

You talk to businessmen. You talk to local leaders. You talk to generals. You talk to spies. You talk to different people. And you patch together a process by which you do the best you can to be transparent to all of them. This is why, I guess, the shorthand that I gave when I talked about the three-on-three talks, the shorthand I was giving was the more people you have in the room when you're talking about agreements you make, the more likely that they hear among themselves, those different leaders, whether they're in uniform or whether they're civil servants or whether they're elected, the more they hear, the transparency of the message we're giving to all of them.

Because they're simply not in a position for one person to say, "Make it happen." I find it terribly difficult. But then again, why shouldn't it be so – I mean why shouldn't a country as diverse and raucous as Pakistan have a system that isn't diverse and raucous? So it's very, very hard to get those things done. But let me add one last question. We've had a tendency to want to go to a country, to a place in a country, where people can actually get results. And that has led us in the past to rely too much on the military because of the military's efficiency. And we may have, in that sense, contributed to the accusation that you sometimes hear from Pakistanis, "You actually like military governments better."

Well, we don't. But what we do understand is that when you go to the military, they're usually pretty good at getting things done. What we have to do is expand that to the other power centers and try to figure out, in that messy way, how we can get our message across.

Arnold Zyplen

Thank you.

Bill Mylem:

Cameron, thanks. That was a very great presentation and some pretty good answers too. I'm Bill **Mylem**, by the way, for those who don't know. I'm now a senior scholar at the Wilson Center. I won't talk about my past. Two questions, Cameron. Short I hope. You mentioned at the beginning, when we talked about Carey, Lubert, Berman and the way we can move on both the political strategic front and other fronts, the political fronts that we need to – that really in terms of our assistance programs, the Pakistanis bear as much blame as we do. And the blame they bear is that they have failed to make any kind of economic, social reforms.

And as a friend of mine, an economist said a few months ago, they have over 50 years managed to perfect a – what you'd call a limited access society. Now that's going to be hard to move into the kind of reform areas that you think necessary, and so do I. So I wonder if you have any ideas on how we manage to help on that. And the second question is the idea of the Indian general staff and the Pakistani general staff sitting down together and talking, seems like a dream. But actually I had the same sort of idea several years ago, and I actually wrote something about it, which is that maybe this would work through a more regional type solution in Afghanistan.

But I think we've blown that now. I wonder about whether you agree with that.

Cameron Munter: On your second question, I don't know. And this is what happens, you know, when you leave the top secret cables behind and go to the West Coast. So I don't know whether we've blown it in Afghanistan. I do think that you can talk about Afghanistan and the future of Afghanistan as needing to have everyone around the table, Congress of Berlin style. Which seems to be the way people talk about a settlement, where you have all the stakeholders involved. But many of the Pakistanis I know, who are diplomats, seem to be very partial to and very comfortable with what I always thought of as kind of triangular diplomacy.

Where instead of having everyone at the table, like in Bohn, where they, you notice, didn't show up, they will have an Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani triangle. Or they will have a Turkish-Pakistani-Afghan triangle. Or an American-Afghan – that is to say, triangular diplomacy because somehow what that does, it emphasizes their role, makes them bigger, and plays to their advantage. There's nothing wrong with that format.

And there's no reason why, instead of saying, "Can you have a grand congress where you sit around the table to solve Afghanistan?" that you can at least – if that can't happen – and I don't know whether something like that will happen – can you at least try to foster, if India and Pakistan can't talk militarily about things other than the tactics of [inaudible] Creek or the [inaudible] Glacier or something like that, is there a format that they could have to talk? And maybe it wouldn't be with us in the room. Maybe we would be seen as too toxic. Maybe the Brits could be the people who could bring them together. Maybe in the context of some other institution like [SARC](#). I don't know.

But I agree with you that it's tough to imagine Indians and Pakistanis simply alone talking about big, strategic issues. If there's any way to make it easier, I think we should. But I was always hesitant, and I think that American policy was right in this. That if on India-Pakistan America insists on getting out front, we're just going to screw it up. It can't be about us. It has to be about them and us, other people of goodwill supporting them. So on India-Pakistan, maybe. Maybe there are other ways to do this than just having the two general staffs talk together.

The question of the reform comes from within. I think of the Dalai Lama, you know, change comes from within. I'm skeptical. And you've been doing this part of the world a lot longer than I have. But I am skeptical about the ability of the institutions to do anything else other than to perfect their limited accessness. And those accusations that get hurled around about the deepening of a feudal system, I mean there's much truth to that. I am not confident that any cricket players or Canadian **imams** are able to come in there, and they use words like tsunami to just sweep it away, kind of Napoleon III style, post 1848, and say, "We're going to change it."

I'm not confident that that can work. One thing I respect about **Imran Kahn** is he at least asks questions that other people don't, and I like that about him. You know, there's many things that are less likable. But I share that feeling with you, that I'm not confident that there is an impulse or a means by which the feudal system – let's call it that – can really be changed from within. That is perhaps an ulterior motive that I have for trying to open the country up as best we can to multilateral impulse. There is a sense – you get – you can do what you said. You can perfect this limited access society best if you feel like no one's watching.

If you feel like you're separate from other people – and talk to the business community. Many of the business community there are making a lot of money by not being global, by protected markets, by limiting things. If you're in, you're already in, you have a piece of a very dynamic country, and you don't really want other people to get involved. So that an ulterior motive of an India-Pakistan opening, an ulterior motive of multilateral and multi-institutional links would be not only the question of providing jobs – if venture capital in **Bangalore** wants to have IT operations in **[inaudible]**, and soak up all of those good English-speaking smart boys who don't have jobs and they're 20 years old, that's a great thing.

But what I like to think is that that then in its train, leads to people thinking about political institutions opening up the country. So sadly, I agree with you. I'm not sure how that could be done from within. But maybe there's a chance that if Pakistan does open up in the next 10 to 20 years, that there will be social and economic trends that could open up the broader feudal system.

And one of the problems I had when I would be asked about George Bush's promise to open up trade access, the thing I didn't

say when I was ambassador – because I wasn't supposed to – but I can say it now, is you know, it's not really something we want to do to increase the power of the very economic kind of leaders who are in the textile industry, to make more money on textiles and keep Pakistan in textiles rather than having Pakistan get out of textiles and go into high tech and go into services and go into more global economic activity.

I would love to think that the change that will take place in Pakistan will follow a realization that there's opportunity in a global world, rather than in the insularity that unfortunately has marked the country over the last decades.

Shuja Nawaz:

Let me just share with you, Mr. Mylem, and others who may not be aware, that the South Asia Center, in partnership with the University of Ottawa, has been running a fairly successful military-to-military dialog between India and Pakistan, where we obviously couldn't take serving military, but we've taken recently retired military as a good surrogate. And so if you need more information on that, just go to our website and see the products that they have produced. We facilitate. They do all the talking. We're just taking notes. Let me move now to the front row again. Again, a reminder, apologies to everyone who's raised their hands. I've got your names here. I'm trying to go around the room to be as democratic as possible.

Barbara Slate:

Thanks, Shuja. I'm Barbara Slate, and I'm a senior fellow in the South Asia Center, and I work on Iran primarily. Two questions about what's going to happen in Afghanistan. Are you concerned that as the U.S. withdraws, there will be even more of a focus on counterterrorism and drones? And secondly, do you – how do you see Pakistan and Iran working with each other or against each other in Afghanistan? Do you foresee the country essentially being split again between those that look toward Tehran and India perhaps, and Russia, the old Northern Alliance, and those who look toward Pakistan for patronage? Thanks.

Cameron Munter:

Well, I said that I get to say things now that I didn't say when I was an ambassador, but I'll revert to my old ambassadorial ways. We're not leaving Afghanistan. We're changing the nature of our commitment to Afghanistan. Right? And I don't mean that hugely ironically. I'd like to think that that's true. And that gets to your first question, are we simply going to hunker down and have drone bases and special operations forces? I don't think so. I really

don't think we're going to limit our commitment to Afghanistan to that. That's going to be a matter of money. It's going to be a matter of the amount that we have committed to assistance programs, to international projects, kind of the NATO legacy there.

So yes, there's a chance, I guess, we could hole up and just do counterterrorism, but I would be sad to see that, first of all. And I'm not sure that really is the case. I'm not sure we're that – we're simply going to limit ourselves to that. But I'm certainly not the one who would know that kind of detail. As for the concern you have, I think it's a very real one, that when many of the Americans who I was with talked to Pakistanis – and I mention again the Kayani 3.0 paper about the vision for Afghanistan – there was a sense that the Americans would come in with this overwhelmingly positivistic social science attitude, that what we're going to do in this country is we're going to have this institution.

We're going to have a judiciary, we're going to have education, we're going to have this. This governor's going to – blah, blah. And you set up a constitution that had more of a centralized notion than history would suggest has been there in the past. I'm choosing my words carefully here. When you talk to General Kayani, the author of Kayani 3.0, he said, "What are you, nuts?" He didn't say it exactly that way because he's much more of a gentleman than that. But he did say there is a tendency historically to think about the cultural differences, the geographical differences, the anthropological differences and the economic differences.

It would be wise for you to talk about the concrete reality of the country, rather than the social science vision. So I can't answer your question, other than to hope that if we're going to come to a meeting of the minds with Pakistan at least – and I have to imagine with other countries as well, like Iran – we may have a problem in that our language and their language, our discourse and their discourse, don't meet. That is we can talk about insisting that there's going to be universal education for women. All good things. You know, all the things we stand for and want to see in a country like that, that we're committed to.

And they can talk to who's going to control this mountaintop? And whose father controlled it before them? And why is it that the [inaudible] really don't like each other? Etc. And is there going to be a mini [inaudible] on the border with Pakistan? Is there

going to be kind of a revival of a Russian-Iranian Northern Alliance? All these kinds of notions which are rooted in history and tradition and all of those kinds of differences, that we don't like to emphasize. We like to emphasize Pakistan as a constitutional state. I would only say, in avoiding the answer to your question, which I don't know, the first step would be to try to find a common language.

That is to say that our policy papers and their policy papers should not be so different. We talk about broad constitutional issues and say, "That's our end state." And they talk about historical questions of decentralization and say, "The end state must take into account the fact that you've got to pick winners and losers." The Pakistanis were asking us, "Who's going to win?" and we're saying, "Whoever wins the election." And they were saying, "Come on, who's – who are you choosing to win?" And we steadfastly to this day refuse to do that because we believe in the constitutional process.

I'm not trying to say who's right or wrong. I'm just saying unless we can talk about the same thing, we're going to have some problems.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. Go over there.

Dana Marshall: It's Dana Marshall with Transnational Strategy Group in American University. Cameron, very nice to see. I wanted to draw you out a little bit on the reconstruction opportunity zone issue. I appreciate your comment about wouldn't it be nice if Pakistan could get out of textile. Perhaps yes. Let's also remember that there is an American textile industry that has a lot of power. If you doubt that, just look at all the problems the United States had had in negotiating agreements.

With the President announcing the acceleration of the Trans-Pacific partnership, and very importantly, a Trans-Atlantic negotiation last night, I wonder if this is – since there is now sort of a trade mood again – trade is back, at least on some agendas, whether some sort of a, this decade version of the ROZs, maybe a better ROZ. Perhaps even something involving India and Afghanistan. Is there any appetite for that? Could it be created? Is it impossible? And what about the 9/11 Commission report that talked about the need for exactly this sort of initiative to reduce the insurgency on the border.

Cameron Munter: I just have to confess that I'm really skeptical about that kind of stuff. I'm skeptical because what it does is it kind of brings back to Bill's question. It retards the kind of reform and the questions about being part of the global economy that we would want to see. It reinforces the feudalism that I think is one of the things that holds the country back. That is an ROZ, as I understand – the ones that we were talking about in the Fahta region of KPK, would be the means by which those people who are already well-entrenched, would have another leg up in creating jobs and exporting to the United States.

Not that it would influence people to go into new stages of the global economy. That is to say, what I fear – and I may be wrong – I'm not sure I'm a good enough economist for this. But the reason I think that ROZs – and there's a lot of reasons why ROZs in this first [inaudible] didn't work – but where I'm not excited about them is that I see it as the stop-gap element to try to create jobs and opportunity without encouraging the kind of reforms that are necessary to bring the country into the 21st century. So I have to say it, if anyone asks me, I would be fundamentally opposed to ROZs and opposed to trade preferences.

I don't think that's the way out. I think that delays – that props up the old industries. That props up the old leadership. It props up the old system. And if we're going to see trade, let's compete in the 21st century items. Let's take advantage of Pakistani ability to innovate, rather than to freeze them into the old system. So sorry if that isn't what you wanted to hear.

Shuja Nawaz: We'll go to the back of the room, Claire. And then I'm going to come forward. I've got all the other names. Don't worry, everyone will get a chance.

Claire Lockhart: Thank you. Some leading figures –

Shuja Nawaz: Please identify yourself for the record.

Claire Lockhart: Claire Lockhart, ISE. Some leading figures in Pakistan openly argue for a continuing policy of destabilizing Afghanistan. There are other constituencies and leading figures that argue that Pakistan's interest lies in a stable Afghanistan. Do you see that constituency growing to a decisive nature? And second part to the question, you mentioned the concept of a regional economic

approach, and there's going to be much focus on the India and China dimension of that. Do you see Pakistan's interest lying in greater access to Central Asian markets, particularly electricity and energy through Afghanistan?

Cameron Munter: The simple answer to No. 2 is yes. I think that it would do everyone good to try to look at Afghanistan as not just a thing, but as a means to be itself integrated into North and South, to the benefit, not just of Afghanistan, but to the benefit of India and Pakistan as well. So I can't imagine we won't continue, we the U.S. government, won't continue the policies of trying – especially in energy areas, which are heavily affected by state policy, that we won't continue to press that. I just can't imagine we won't. Now it's hard to get those countries in Central Asia which are sometimes not always easy to work with, to get them to do things that are going to be constructive to live up to the agreements and things like that.

That's not easy. But I think it's very worth trying to do. So that's for sure. I don't know who says publicly they want to destabilize Afghanistan. I mean this sounds naïve, but who says that? You said there are two types, the people who say we want to destabilize Afghanistan, and we want to have a stable Afghanistan. I'm not familiar with those who say we want to destabilize Afghanistan. I mean am I misunderstanding the question? I don't –

Claire Lockhart: There have been presentations in DC where people have articulated that Pakistan's policy is or interest lies –

Cameron Munter: True, people have accused Pakistan of doing those. Are there Pakistanis who have actually said this? I mean I don't know which Pakistanis would admit to saying, "Yeah, I want to destabilize Afghanistan." I don't know who those people are.

Claire Lockhart: Well, the second part of my question, do you see a growing constituency who articulate a policy of accepting and working towards a stable Afghanistan?

Cameron Munter: I guess I do. Because I don't see a constituency that doesn't want that. And maybe I'm playing with words. I'm sorry. There are different visions of what Afghanistan will be in Pakistan. Whether Afghanistan and Pakistan need to be very closely allied, whether there's a live and let live relationship, whether there's a focus only on the ethnic [inaudible] areas of Afghanistan as Pakistan's

special relationship. There are various visions, I guess, among Pakistanis. But I don't know of any serious leaders or powers in Pakistan who want to destabilize Afghanistan. I guess there are people – there are analysts who say that the various people either in the Pakistani military or intelligence like to stir the pot so that they can maximize their influence.

I simply – I think they are much more scared than that. Maybe I'm naïve. I think they're much more scared of an Afghanistan out of control than they are optimistic about an Afghanistan which, in an unsettled situation, allows them for opportunities. I think that – I would just make that point – I think there are a lot of people in Pakistan who are very, very skittish about what's going to happen, and want certainty, and came to us looking for a certainty that we were not able to give them, and now are very nervous about what will happen after 2014.

Shuja Nawaz: Right next to you, [inaudible] the back row. I think it's Anne.

Anne Switzer: Yes. Thank you. I'm Anne Switzer. I'm an anthropologist and I've spent quite a bit of time in Pakistan. I actually had a – my question really has been asked before. I was thinking how are you going to promote the reform that should happen? And I'm just thinking you've referred to changing the economic structure, sort of pressures from outside, and also trying to work with NGOs and other [inaudible] to focus more on the long term. How would you go about changing that within this country? Changing the understanding from the short term to the long term?

Cameron Munter: So if I understand your question correctly, if what we're looking for is a general effort to try to get Pakistan to open up and to take advantage of much of its potential, economically, and then the commensurate social change that would take place, even political, how do we get people here who have a certain prejudice and a fear about Pakistan, how do we get them to engage? I think that one way to do this is through getting different players, trying to encourage different players to get involved. We've overwhelmingly looked at Pakistan over the last decade, since 9/11. When you see it in the newspapers, it is usually associated with counterterrorism or with the war on terror and these kinds of things.

Understandably. But while that is very, very important, it's not the entire story. And so the idea would be not so much looking to the

U.S. government to try to say, “We’re not going to do counterterrorism anymore.” We’re going to do counterterrorism, and that’s just the way it’s going to be. But in addition to that, can we foster the kind of links institutionally that would actually start a separate conversation. University to university, philanthropy to philanthropy, business to business, that’s what I would suggest. And I agree someone like you who has been doing this for a long time, this is a long and laborious process because you know, the University of Texas is not made of money that it wants to spend in exchanges with Pakistan.

But it may be that if we have some successes in those cross-border and international areas, that that will be the best advertisement for more people to begin to do what they’ve done. I mean the U.S. embassy has the largest **Fulbright** program in the world, in Pakistan. That’s a start. But it tends to be one way. They’re all coming this way. How then do we build on that to have people who are interested in Pakistan, and not necessarily just interested in Osama bin Laden, going to Pakistan to do the kind of work like the people have done at **Harappa**, for example. You know, the kind of archaeological work, kind of – just in the area of classical studies, there is enormous opportunity if people will stop being scared to go to Pakistan.

How do we help that? I think it’s a chicken and egg question. The more people you get who go there and say, “I went to Pakistan and I came back and I’m in one piece,” the more people do that, the more other people will say, “I read in the newspaper, I read Ahmed Rashid’s book with flames on the front, and I’m scared to go to Pakistan. But I went there and my friend went there. He had a great time. He was careful. He was sober about his experience. But he met people who were interested in good things, and he would go back.” It sounds corny. I guess it comes down to people to people processes, and that’s a long-term question that’s going to take some more money.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. We are getting close to the end of the session, so I’m going to try and speed up the process. So we’ve got Dr. **Nassard**, and then I’m going to ask you to hold your answer to the one question that Dr. Nassard will ask, and then I’ll go to another person for one question. So you can answer the two together.

Dr. Nassard: Thank you very much Shuja for inviting Ambassador Munter here. It’s good to see him because he knows the ground realities in

Pakistan. It's a great event. And I must say that during his stay in Pakistan, it was a very turbulent time, and he was fishing like in high seas during all his tenure. I just want to ask him, and that lady asked a question also, I agree with Ambassador Munter that Pakistan's stability and Afghanistan's stability has virtually become interdependent. And nobody in Pakistan wants to destabilize Pakistan. I have not heard it from anybody else. Anyway, my question is, during your stay there, what was your most difficult challenges?

You talked [inaudible], but generally people believe [inaudible] building is more important than anything else. And what kind of disconnect did you find between the ruling elite and the people? Rulers and the ruled? And about the media you mentioned, has become independent and powerful. With that power, have they also become equally responsible also, in your opinion? Thank you very much.

Shuja Nawaz: Okay. The next question is the gentleman whose phone rang.

Male Speaker 1: I apologize.

Cameron Munter: That was the question being phoned in.

Male Speaker 1: I have about four or five questions.

Shuja Nawaz: No, we need one short question please because I have a whole bunch of people I want to recognize.

Male Speaker 1: I know.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you.

Male Speaker 1: Do you believe that there is a strong sense and some critical analysis is being done in the administration, that there's a need for a new narrative with respect to the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan, and with some countries in general that establishes a deep-rooted belief that we are credible partners in war and peace. And we talked about transaction relationships which have been on and off, and they have also been a source of mistrust, that we move away from that, as some of those decisions which have been taken have lacked transparency. So is there a sense, is there a critical analysis being doing to – and do you believe that those long-term

credible relationships are possible with the Muslim world, and Pakistan in particular?

And has the drone policy been a success or failure?

Shuja Nawaz: That's already been covered, so I think – go ahead.

Cameron Munter: I'll try to make it as rapid as I can. The question of the ruler in the road here, I had a very senior Pakistani military officer say, "You know, you've talked about the trust deficit that America has. Your trust deficit with Pakistan is nothing like the trust deficit between the people who run Pakistan and the people of Pakistan. That's much worse." So smart people in Pakistan – and there are tens of millions of them – are aware of precisely that problem, that the issues that we talk about in the problems of U.S. and Pakistan, are in many ways dwarfed by the internal problems within Pakistan about trust in government and legitimacy of government.

The fear that somehow this fairly young country that has institutions that maybe aren't legitimate. So I think you're on to something, and you mentioned the media. The media are, in many ways, a great hope for Pakistan. They're immature and wild, but there are some very thoughtful people and some very thoughtful institutions who can have a real impact on the way that Pakistan opens up to the world. So while I can't tell you that the media is mature, on the other hand, it's pretty impressive, and there are pieces of it that I think can play a very positive element there. So I came away from Pakistan kind of – you asked a series of questions, and I'll just sum them up.

I came away with optimism about the ferment that's going on in Pakistani society, whether it's media, whether it's business, whether it's schools, whether it's trying to deal with the issues of growth. The institutions make it hard. This is Bill Mylem's point. The institutions have become so calcified that it is very difficult, even for people of goodwill, even people of goodwill who are in those institutions, to try to make them be responsive to people. And yet if they don't, what you're going to do is have this legitimacy question come back again and again. Is the government working on my behalf? Or are these institutions working on my behalf?

It's still a problem. I'm more optimistic now than I was before, but it's just going to be a long process. And for us to contribute to

that, I think what we have to do is help not only government to government, but the other institutions in the country. On the question of a need for a new narrative, again, I'm against the U.S.-Pakistani narrative or the U.S.-Islamic narrative. I think there are broader questions. To get caught in a doctrine of that sort I think is the wrong – it's not the way I would go about it. It would be much more trying to talk with people – and this is where I got into the difference about transactional language.

Trying to talk honestly about concrete things that need to be done. How do we get more students to study agriculture? How do we get more students to – how do we get venture capitalists to invest in a country where they're scared to go? Those kinds of questions, done openly, are not transactional to me. They are simply pieces of a puzzle, where the parts can grow into a broader vision. We've tried, I think, to define the relationship so carefully, that this is – we've gotten into a rut, I fear. And so we deal with stereotypes rather than with problems. So I would be much more modest in my approach about the Islamic world, rather than saying, "This is what America thinks about Islam."

These are big issues. Rather than spending our time doing that, let's say, "How do we solve this problem, this problem, this problem, this problem?" And from that, perhaps, some of the solutions emanate into, if not, as the Germans would say, a [inaudible] concept of any sort, but that we have a series of successes that tell us that we know how to get along with each other in an honest way. And I would – my experience tells me from Pakistan, I would much rather see that than spend a lot of time coming up with a brilliant analysis of where we ought to go. In this particular case, I'm much more kind of enamored by the idea of getting real and concrete successes rather than having overarching theories.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. Cameron, I hope you don't mind staying on a little longer.

Cameron Munter: Of course. Of course. Happy to.

Shuja Nawaz: I do want to get to the back. We have two questions at the back, and then I'm going to come forward and get the remaining – I'm not taking any further names at this time. I'm sorry.

Brian Lapp: Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, my name is Brian Lapp. I'm with the Boeing Company. On behalf of Boeing, and as an American citizen, I want to commend you on your service and thank you for your service. I think if you haven't received any recognition or meritorious awards from the State Department or from the White House, it's overdue, given –

Cameron Munter: From your mouth to Carey's ear, I'm ready.

Brian Lapp: I'll do my best. I'm actually quite surprised this question hasn't been raised in this forum yet, and I'm not an expert on this. I have heard this to be true. I don't know if it's true, but it seems quite alarming to me. I've heard that Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear weapons program in the world. And it seems very alarming to me. I was wondering if you could comment on whether that keeps you up at night, on top of the other litany of issues that are going on in Pakistan. I would welcome your comments on that. Thank you.

Shuja Nawaz: Second question?

Male Speaker 2: Yes, thank you very much. I'm [inaudible]. I work for [inaudible] of America [inaudible] border region. We brought [inaudible] to Pakistan [inaudible] border region areas, radio and TV. Thank you very much, Ambassador, and also Shuja for arranging this interesting discussion. My question is, before that, Ambassador, yes, and I share your point of view that many people here in Washington, they make their image and opinion based on some books or something. But it's happening to us, so I come from [inaudible], and as a journalist, this question has been in my mind. You've been there on the ground and you know the reality for Pakistan.

From Washington, we see that the commitment has changed. It wants a lasting relationship and more the civilian government and things there. But given the fact that in Pakistan, there is no one Pakistan. It's a military and civilian. You know the reality. So from the Pakistan perspective, especially the military, how much [inaudible] about Washington, the understanding about Washington relationship has changed, when you were leaving the post there? So at this particular time, what change has happened? Does that make you helpful or no? Thank you very much.

Cameron Munter: Okay. If I understand your question correctly, it's what did I perceive in the changes of attitudes from the Pakistani military towards the United States during my time there. There were a number of things. At the senior level, those people – there was a so-called generation – you know, the lost generation that people talk about – those military leaders who, during the 1990s were not able to study in the United States because of sanctions. The people who are in charge are still older than that, are still in a previous generation. Right? So you have this sociology of the military where, I think, maybe the colonels and some of the majors and maybe the brigadiers, maybe they know us a little less.

But the senior people, the two-star generals, three-star generals, still know us. So what I saw among those very, very senior people was that many of them were terribly disappointed during my time because they had both emotional friendships – they had been to Leavenworth, they had been to Carlisle, they been with Americans – and their expectations of what America could do for the country were very, very high still. And they were disappointed in us. Okay? So the people who wanted very much to see a strong relationship with the United States were in disarray and felt that the events that took place when I was there, hurt the relationship.

I don't know about that next tier down, those colonels. They have said, "You see? I never trusted the Americans. Now this is the truth." And it may have reinforced some of their feelings of negativity. And I think one of the most interesting things that you raise is the sociology of the military, the differences within the military – we tend to talk about the Pakistani military, like it's a thing. It's actually not just a thing. It's a very complex organization in the throes of a lot of change. And I think you're on to an important point when you look at that. That will be something that will, I think, have a big impact on the future.

And our impact on that, I can say with surety, was not positive. Those people who wanted to believe in us, were disappointed. Those people who had the worst feelings about us, felt that they had their worst fears realized. On the question of nuclear weapons, yeah, it's a great concern. And it's a huge concern to our government that the future of Pakistan's military program is something that we have some sort of positive engagement on. That is to say, we can turn away from Pakistan, as some people said. There was one very senior guy, whose name I won't mention, but said, "We need to contain Pakistan. We need to hold them back."

And as a diplomat who started his career in the communist bloc, containment is not always a pretty thing. It's not something that's really an effective way to deal with countries.

You deal with it when you have to. So the idea of standing away from Pakistan and withdrawing from it somehow – because they disappointed us so much – is, to me, most terrifying precisely in the field you're talking about. It's in the area of nuclear weapons, where despite any violations they've made, despite the differences we have about the non-proliferation treaty and things of that sort, we must stay engaged with them, simply to be able to have the kind of dialog to prevent accidents, to prevent misunderstandings with India, and to prevent the further proliferation from the **[inaudible]** era and things, to try to make sure that doesn't happen again.

So I can only say I share your concern, and there are lots of people in the U.S. government who share your concern, and the **[inaudible]** for that is engagement. We have to stay engaged with them.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. Next pair of gentlemen at the back, and then coming up front.

Daniel Phillips: Daniel Phillips from **[inaudible]** International. I was hoping you could talk about the upcoming elections, particularly the – if you care to speculate on the outcome, that would be great, but also if you'd like to talk about the potential for unrest, particularly – I mean more so than just riots or anything like that, but serious destabilizing, long-term unrest.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you. And now the gentleman here.

Male Speaker 3: Ambassador, thank you. I'm a Navy guy from India, **[inaudible]**, and I want to talk about the possibility of making money within India and Pakistan, South Asia, through the Indian Ocean. Sadly, I find that all the diplomats and everybody is talking about land-locked continental differences. Why not look at a new opportunity to combine the **[inaudible]**, Indian Navy and the Pakistan Navy, and look at the **[inaudible]** Indian Ocean, which are very critical, even in the short term. And I'm sorry to report to you, Ambassador, but so many people, and nobody is looking at the

Indian Ocean. Everybody talks [inaudible] Indian Ocean is the bridge between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

But in hard terms, Arabian Sea, a small lake, continues to be an uncommon common, and we can get away. And I think the time has come where we have to shed baggage and look at this opportunity very seriously, and I want your views on that.

Cameron Munter: I'll start with your second question first, which is, you are absolutely right. We have ignored that, and we're not wise to ignore that. We just have. We've been caught in the traditional, in the Indian-Pakistan discussion, on traditional elements of cross-border trade. Which are important. But this is an opportunity. The only thing I can think of as an initiative that we did begin when I was ambassador there, which was to try to get the stock markets of Karachi and Mumbai to work together. Because these are people who think in a maritime way. These are people who are not caught up in some of the traditional border kinds of issues.

But I have nothing that I can add, other than, yes, it's something we should think about more, and guilty as accused. We just didn't think about it that much, and it's a very good idea. Why not think of the possibilities of commerce and other kinds of cooperation in the region? So I think it's a great idea, and you're right, we haven't done enough about it.

Male Speaker 3: I just want to add [inaudible].

Shuja Nawaz: Can we just get the mic to you, please?

Male Speaker 3: Thank you. I just want to – I've just given a paper to Shuja on preserving the Indian Ocean. Not any high strategy. But on the pragmatic, to look at the Indian Ocean and look at the straits. It's very simple, and I urge you, even your professorial or diplomatic, to look at America, India and Pakistan, and I'm sure that you will find some common ground. Because then we can move on to the very difficult questions of Kashmir and Afghanistan. They will go. But the Indian Ocean is there, and I think we can do a lot.

Cameron Munter: I couldn't agree more. I think it's a great idea. On the question of the election, I don't know who's going to win, you'll be astonished to know. But I would be careful about expecting wild swings. And the reason for that is, as you know, the Pakistani electoral system is stacked in favor of people who have strong local

organizations. So that it's very, very difficult for upstart organizations to come in and upset them. So rather than look at the ideas of some of the more radical challengers, I think the key here is – not that anyone's really proud of that – to look at the ability to mobilize people in the districts.

And you don't see too many places in the world where people talk about voter banks. You know, voter banks are basically the idea that citizens are not constituents. They are recipients of patronage. And so in a top-down patronage-based electoral system, you can make certain predictions about how people are going to vote that you wouldn't in a country where you're having traditional elections. So I would only steer you towards probably the expectations that while things could change, I don't think they're going to change wildly because of what happens on the ground. And studying what happens on the ground is the way to understand things.

Many people I've talked to in Pakistan are of the opinion that you could end up with, instead of having two big parties and [inaudible], you may in fact get a lessening of the power of the two big parties, and have a series of parties, more Israeli style, where you have to put together coalitions that are larger than what have been put together in the past. If that is true – and I don't know if that's true – if that's true, that would lead to stability at the cost of any ability to ram through difficult reforms. Because you would have so many people in the government who had to be pleased, that it would be very, very hard to go against their interests.

But you could have a government that would be stable enough to last. So that everyone could say, "Isn't this great? We've passed power on from one democratic government to the next, and the institutions are getting stronger." But the actual task of reform could be much more difficult.

Shuja Nawaz: Again, I'm very grateful to all of you for your patience. I have to last questions, one from [inaudible] and the other from [inaudible]. And then we'll let you all go. And Cameron, thank you for your patience.

Cameron Munter: Excellent.

Female Speaker 1: [Inaudible].

- Shuja Nawaz: We need you to speak a little louder into the mic.
- Female Speaker 1: Oh. Ambassador Munter, in your – as ambassador in [inaudible], what was your biggest –
- Shuja Nawaz: It's not working.
- Female Speaker 1: What was your biggest disappointment as ambassador for two years?
- Cameron Munter: What do I say?
- Shuja Nawaz: Okay. Moving on.
- Male Speaker 4: Okay. I suppose what's your biggest victory [inaudible]. But my other question was during your time as ambassador and in the State Department, there was a tremendous effort to engage [inaudible]. An organized way, with resource and effort, and a lot of people to build these ties as an intermediary linkage. How did you – what were your observations after two years? Where do you see hope in that as a vehicle for linkage building? How would you grade it? And what advice would you give going forward?
- Cameron Munter: Okay. On this first question about what the greatest disappointment is. You know, I wasn't someone who knew Pakistan well before I went there. And so when you go to Pakistan for the first time, what you realize – I mean I hope other people have this experience – is you realize the affinity that Pakistanis and Americans have in some fundamental way, that, having served in places like Europe, I didn't always find that. You know, you find people who are like America – kind of in a visceral, almost an emotional way. Very upfront, very blunt, very much focused on certain issues that of common interest.

So I had the difficulty of being there at a tough time, when I was getting to understand that affinity, but seeing that the policy wasn't fitting that. That is the high hopes that people had and kind of the intrinsic friendship that I sensed between Pakistanis and America, were simply being battered every day by the imbalances and the policies, the failures of Pakistani reform, the failures of American sensitivity and counterterrorism and things of that sort. So it was just the crash of every day against the growing understanding, that I hoped was growing understanding on my part, of the potential

affinity that these two countries have. That was very painful for me. It was excruciating.

But I can't imagine, it must be even more excruciating if you'd been doing it for 50 years. So that was the hardest thing for me. But it does lead me to have the optimism that if we're able to deal with times that are less fraught with crisis, that the basis is there for a very good relationship. I'm pretty optimistic about a U.S.-Pakistani relationship in the long term. It's getting through the short term that I'm a little worried about. As for the **Diaspra**, Diaspra can help in both, and especially in the long term. I think that there is – I'm not aware that there is an overarching mission to the Diaspra, that the Diaspra has some sort of sense of coming together.

Much like Pakistan, you have Punjabis, you have **Belots**, you have **Cindies**, you have – you know, you have that diversity, which on the one hand, one of the great things about Pakistan, but one of the crippling things in the Diaspra, that is cross-cutting not only – I don't want to say ethnically, but also in terms of you have a number of Pakistani-Americans who are professionals, a number who are in finance, a number who are driving taxis. Getting the Diaspra together as a thing, I think is not easy. So the question is what would be the unifying themes that could bring the Diaspra together, that would get them to try to find the common ground that make an impact in one area?

You notice that when the floods came, the Diaspra was great. It was focused, it was clear, everyone went to work and made a real difference.

Speaker: How big is the Diaspra? I don't know **[inaudible]**.

Cameron Munter: I don't know either. A million?

Speaker **[Inaudible]**.

Shuja Nawaz: 700,000.

Cameron Munter: But it is, compared to the discussions I had with my British counterpart, the potential for people who are very successful in the United States, as opposed to kind of the working class nature of many of the people in Britain, it gives opportunities here, both for fundraising and for projects, and focus on things like education,

that maybe they don't have in Britain. So I would only say that it would be – it's the age-old problem of Diasprans. People are here because this is where they live, not because they're thinking about Pakistan all the time.

How do you get people to focus and have pride on the fact that they're Americans, and yet make a contribution to a Pakistan where many of them are skeptical about the ability of the local government, and with some good reason, to use say money or efforts that they have in an honest and open way? So the only thing I can think of is that it would be wise to try, as people have done in the last couple of years, America-Pakistan Foundation and so to say, what are a couple of unifying principles, a variation on the idea of what about this transactional relationship – what are kind of the concrete things that we really care about? If we care about education, if we care about – not at the exclusion of everything else, but this is going to be the signature elements of what the Diaspra does.

Then the question would be, if there can be that consensus, that would be a great first step towards then moving on to work with the U.S. government and the Pakistani authorities of some sort, on projects. So that's what I would call for. Try to see if there is one set of issues or one issue that can define as many of the Diaspra as possible. But that's really hard. And it's not unique to the Pakistani Diaspra. This happens with Diasprans of all sorts. The final thing I would add is I would love to see a definition of the Diaspra as a South Asian Diaspra. There is, I think, when I visited people in Silicon Valley, I noticed there are a number of cricket teams.

And the cricket teams are not India versus Pakistan. You know, they're Apple versus Microsoft. That is to say, Indians and Pakistanis play on the same side. And it would be an interesting thing to try to get out of the national channel, and to have South Asian interests, and I think especially the business community, may be willing to say, maybe what we want to do is talk about a South Asian Diaspra set of projects that could bring in the Sri Lankans, that could bring in the Bangladeshis, etc. And maybe redefine things that way. I'm not sure how easy that would be, but it seems promising because in many cases, that integration has taken place in the United States.

Shuja Nawaz: Thank you very much, Cameron. And if I could just answer Master Cook's question on the Diaspora, it's roughly between 700,000 and 1 million, and it sends every year \$2.6 billion to Pakistan as remittances. More than the Carey, Lubert Berman bill. So they are doing their bit.

Cameron Munter: More than USAID. But the point about that has been – and correct me if I'm wrong – it does tend to be very specific. That is to say, if you're from a village in the Punjab, your remittances tend to go toward that village in the Punjab.

Shuja Nawaz: It's direct transfers.

Cameron Munter: They're direct transfers. So that in other words, not towards broad projects, but towards specific elements. But that's a huge amount of money.

Shuja Nawaz: And that's part of our 13 to 14 billion dollar remittances every year. So it's a fairly sizable direct efficient transfer of resources. And Master Munter, thank you very much on behalf of my colleagues and the South Asia Center.

[End of Audio]

Duration: 108 minutes